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COMMENT
Chrismon v. Guilford County and Hall v. City of Durham:
Redefining Contract Zoning and Approving Conditional Use
Zoning in North Carolina
Zoning law has a short history in the United States, originating around the
turn of this century.I The United States Supreme Court approved a basic form
of zoning in 1926 when a local government divided its village into districts and
2
stipulated the types of buildings and property uses permissible in each district.
Since this ruling, cities, counties, and developers have sought procedures to increase flexibility in zoning, especially in transition areas between differently
zoned districts. 3 Some commentators have proposed "conditional zoning," a
procedure whereby a zoning authority may place some conditions on a landowner's rezoning request to limit the effects of rezoning on neighboring properties. 4 Two North Carolina writers have proposed "conditional use zoning," an
innovative practice whereby a zoning authority may create conditional use dis1. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926) (noting that zoning
laws began around 25 years earlier).
2. Id. at 397.
3. Two North Carolina authors illustrate a potential problem with traditional zoning:
For example, perhaps a lot zoned "residential" adjoining a "commercial area" should not
reasonably be "residential," but rezoning it commercial (with all legal uses permitted)
would only aggravate the land-use problem. But if the rezoning was accompanied by certain conditions or use limitations, or both, a rezoning could perhaps not only offer a reasonable use for the property but also solve a land-use relationship problem.
S. DAVENPORT

& P.

GREEN, SPECIAL USE AND CONDITIONAL USE DISTRICTS: A WAY TO IM-

MORE SPECIFIC ZONING CONTROLS 13 (N.C. Inst. Gov't., 1980), quoted in Chrismon v.
Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 619, 370 S.E.2d 579, 584 (1988). When this pamphlet was published, Mr. Davenport was assistant director of the Greensboro Planning Department, and Professor
Green was a faculty member at the Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. Id. at v.
The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that "[c]omprehensive zoning systems, though effective in preserving the character of ongoing uses, are often criticized for not allowing for the degree of
flexibility needed to allow local officials to respond appropriately to 'constantly shifting conditions
and public needs.'" Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 617-18, 370 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting Brough, Flexibility
POSE

Without Arbitrarinessin the Zoning System: Observations on North CarolinaSpecial Exception and
Zoning Amendment Cases, 53 N.C.L. REV. 925, 925 (1975)). The court also stated that "the 'all or
nothing' approach of traditional zoning techniques is insufficient in today's world of rapid industrial
expansion and pressing urban and rural social and economic problems." Id. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at
586. Another writer critical of basic "Euclidian" zoning observed that the "simple pattern" of districts is "incapable of accommodating the whole complex of land uses, and it cannot be tailored to
the specific needs of a community without the creation of an unwieldy number and variety of districts." R. ANDERSON, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.17, at 153 (3d ed. 1986).
4. Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1968) (proposing condi-

tional zoning); see also Comment, Toward a Strategy for Utilization of Contract and Conditional

Zoning, 51 J. URB. L. 94, 95-96 (1973) (noting the need for greater flexibility in land use regulation
and expressing approval of conditional zoning). Shapiro suggests that conditional zoning may best
serve the public interest: "If a parcel of land is ripe for more intensive development and the landowner can achieve his purposes with a lesser use than allowed by the proposed classification, a
zoning authority should be able to request conditions to minimize the effects of the zoning change."
Shapiro, supra, at 277. For further discussion of conditional zoning and consideration of cases approving the practice, see infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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tricts in which property has no uses available "as of right" but requires a conditional use permit for any use.5 The North Carolina Supreme Court recently
opened the door for greater adaptability in zoning amendments in two cases,
7
Chrismon v. Guilford County 6 and Hall v. City of Durham.
In Chrismon the court followed the North Carolina legislature's lead and
approved conditional use zoning, which allows cities and counties to create conditional use districts, to rezone property to such a district upon a landowner's
request, and to restrict the uses of that property to those permitted under a
separately approved conditional use permit. 8 In both Chrismon and Hall the
court narrowed the definition of contract zoning previously applied in North
Carolina, holding that contract zoning occurs only when a zoning authority and
a landowner reach a bilateral agreement. 9 As a result of these decisions, zoning
law in North Carolina has undergone significant adjustments in three areas:
first, the factors that determine whether spot zoning has a reasonable basis and
therefore may be upheld;' 0 second, the situations that will result in a finding of
contract zoning;" and, third, the approval of conditional use zoning.12
3
This Comment begins by defining the relevant zoning terms and doctrines1
and then reviews the Chrismon and Hall decisions.' 4 The Comment describes
how those decisions significantly affected the North Carolina zoning law, 15 paying particular attention to (1) how the court redefined contract zoning while
retaining prohibitions on careless practices once thought to be included in contract zoning,' 6 and (2) how the conditional use zoning practice differs from conditional zoning.' 7 The Comment then considers some questions that remain
unanswered after Chrismon and Hall.t8 The Comment concludes that the ad5. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 6-7. A conditional use district is a zoning
district that has no uses listed as being permitted "as of right." Uses permitted "as of right" are
property uses automatically granted to the landowner without further approval from the zoning
authority. A conditional use district only lists conditional uses, and a landowner must obtain a
conditional use permit in order to use his property for one of the conditional uses. For a further
description of conditional use zoning, see infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
6. 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
7. 323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
8. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 614-17, 370 S.E.2d at 582-83; Act of July 4, 1985, ch. 607, 1985
N.C. Sess. Laws 776 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342, 160A-382 (1987)).
9. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 568; Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 634-35, 370 SE.2d at
592-93. For further discussion of contract zoning, see infra notes 43-52 & 160-206 and accompany-

ing text.
10. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 19-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 80-151 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 152-225 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text, The court retained prohibitions against
"insufficiently analyzed rezoning," a doctrine that has existed but has not been named. The supreme
court has held that a zoning authority must consider all uses available for property rezoned to a
general use district. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 544-45, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440-41 (1971),
This Comment proposes that this concept be called "insufficiently analyzed rezoning." See infra
notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 226-74 and accompanying text.
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justment to the definition of contract zoning provides much-needed clarity without sacrificing restrictions on zoning that are not thoroughly examined. It also

concludes that the concept of conditional use zoning places North Carolina in
the forefront of developing flexibility devices. However, serious questions remain after Chrismon about the practical application of conditional use zoning.
I.
A.

DEFINITIONS OF ZONING TERMINOLOGY

General Use District
In delegating zoning power to cities and counties, 19 the North Carolina

legislature specifically authorized cities and counties to create "general use districts, in which a variety of uses are permissible in accordance with general standards." 20 The city or county zoning ordinance describes each general use
district by listing the uses permitted for all property within that district. Thus,

each landowner knows which uses are "permitted as of right" 21 for her property
and the neighboring properties. In addition to these permitted uses, the general

use district also may list conditional uses. These conditional uses are available

to individual tracts upon the issuance of a conditional use permit, to be granted

22
if the property meets certain enumerated conditions.
When applying for rezoning from one general use district to another, the

applicant requests the rezoning of the property to allow all uses permitted in
another zone. For example, the applicant may request rezoning from a residential district to a commercial district or from a residential district with low density restrictions to a district with higher density restrictions. 23 Before granting
the rezoning request, the zoning authority must consider all of the uses that will
be permitted as of right under the new zoning classification and must determine
24
the appropriateness of each use for that parcel of land.
19. The power to zone is a legislative power vested in the general assembly, but the state legislature has delegated this authority to municipalities and counties. Allred, 277 N.C. at 540, 178 S.E.2d
at 437; Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 433-34, 160 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-340 (1987) (granting to counties the authority to zone); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382
(1987) (granting zoning authority to cities).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-342 (1987) (granting districting authority to counties); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1987) (granting similar authority to cities).
21. See Woodhouse v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 211, 214-15, 261 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1980)
(uses "permitted by right" in a general use district); S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supranote 3, at 7
("uses by right").
22. See Woodhouse, 299 N.C. at 215-16, 261 S.E.2d at 885-86. See also zoning ordinances cited
infra note 25.
23. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 295-96, 372 S.E.2d 564, 566-67 (1988).
Applicant's property was divided between two districts-a C-1 district (neighborhood commercial)
and a R-20 district (single-family residential). The applicant requested rezoning of its property to a
C-4(D) district (heavy commercial). Uses permitted in a C-4(D) district, but not in C-i or R-20,
included adult entertainment, drive-in theaters, crematoria, warehouses, mobile home sales lots, and
correctional institutions.
24. If the zoning authority rezones the property without considering all of those uses, the rezoning may be invalidated because it constitutes "insufficiently analyzed rezoning." See infra notes
53-57 and accompanying text.
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Conditional Use Permits

In addition to uses permitted as of right, a zoning ordinance may provide
for conditional uses in a given general use district. These conditional uses are
permissible for property within that district upon the issuance of a conditional
use permit. 25 The city council or county board of commissioners may determine
whether to grant a conditional use permit, but the statutes also allow the city
council or county board of commissioners to delegate this permitting authority
26
to the board of adjustment for the city or county.
Because conditional use permits have been allowed in general use districts
for many years, an extensive case law has developed concerning when the council or board must grant such a permit and how the decisions will be reviewed in
the courts. 2 7 As a result of this case law, a zoning authority has less discretion
when deciding whether to grant a conditional use permit than it has when deciding to rezone property to a different general use district: "When an applicant
[for a conditional use permit] has produced competent, material, and substantial
evidence tending to establish the existence of the facts and conditions which the
ordinance requires for the issuance of a special use permit, prima facie he is
entitled to it."' 28 This prima facie entitlement to a conditional use permit shifts
the burden to the zoning authority to show sufficient reason why it denied a
permit.29 Conditional use permit decisions, unlike "legislative" decisions to rezone property to a new district, are considered quasi-judicial. 30 Therefore, a
heightened standard of review applies when the courts review the decision. 3' On
appeal of a conditional use permit decision, the trial court "sits in the posture of
an appellate court. The trial court does not review the sufficiency of evidence
25. See, e.g., GREENSBORO, N.C. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 30-202-203 (May 11, 1989);
Guilford County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance § 6-17 (1988) (examples of conditional use districts); see
also Woodhouse, 299 N.C. at 214-15, 261 S.E.2d at 885 (ordinance allowing both permitted uses as
of right and conditional uses); Harts Book Stores, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 53 N.C. App. 753, 755-57,
281 S.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1981) (example of a special use ordinance). State statutes grant such permitting authority provided that the zoning ordinance includes the specific conditions and procedures

required for the granting of a conditional use permit. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-340, 160A-381
(1987).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-340, 160A-381 (1987).
27. See Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 626-27, 265
S.E.2d 379, 383 (1980) (describing the scope ofjudicial review); Woodhouse, 299 N.C. at 216-19, 261
S.E.2d at 886-88 (once an applicant for a permit shows that the request and the property in question
meet all of the conditions imposed in the ordinance, the board may not deny the permit without
sufficient reason supported by evidence); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C.
458, 468, 202 S.E.2d 129, 136 (1974) (establishing when an applicant is entitled to a conditional use
permit).
28. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 284 N.C. at 468, 202 S.E.2d at 136; see also Woodhouse, 299 N.C.
at 218-21, 261 S.E.2d at 887-89 (reviewing decisions of other states on the standards for granting or
denying conditional and special use permits).
29. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 284 N.C. at 468, 202 S.E.2d at 136 ("A denial of the permit should
be based upon findings contra which are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence
appearing in the record.").
30. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 299 N.C. at 625-26, 265 S.E.2d at 382-83; Humble Oil &
Ref Co., 284 N.C. at 469, 202 S.E.2d at 136-37 ("When a board of aldermen, a city council, or
zoning board [of adjustment] hears evidence to determine the existence of facts and conditions upon
which the ordinance expressly authorizes it to issue a special use permit, it acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity.").
31. CoastalReady-Mix Concrete Co., 299 N.C. at 625-27, 265 S.E.2d at 382-83.
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presented to it but reviews that evidence presented to the town board."' 32 The
trial court must ensure that the permit decision is "supported by competent,
material and substantial evidence in the whole record."' 33 Thus, the decision to
grant or deny a conditional use permit is subject to more searching review than a
legislative decision to rezone property to a different zoning district. The city
council, county board of commissioners, or the board of adjustment must be
careful to "follow the procedures specified in the ordinance," conduct all hearings in accordance with "fair-trial standards," and compile a thorough record

34
showing sufficient reasons for the grant or denial of a conditional use permit.

C. Spot Zoning
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Blades v. City of Ra-

leigh 35 established the foundation for spot zoning. In Blades the Raleigh City

Council, after considering a developer's request, rezoned a parcel of five acres
from one residential district to another residential district allowing higher density and a broader range of uses. 3 6 The five-acre plot and surrounding area originally had been zoned single-family residential, 37 but the applicant wanted a
zoning change so that he could build twenty luxury apartments on the five-acre
site. 38 When neighbors challenged the zoning amendment, the supreme court

invalidated the City Council's decision, holding that the zoning change constituted impermissible spot zoning.39 The court defined spot zoning as a zoning
amendment that changed the zoning restrictions for a small tract of land so that
the small tract was either burdened by or relieved from restrictions that existed
4° From this definition, two requirements for spot
for the land surrounding it.

zoning emerged: (1) a small tract of land that is rezoned, and (2) zoning restric32. Id. at 626-27, 265 S.E.2d at 383. The trial court, and any appellate court thereafter, reviews
this quasi-judicial decision by:
(1) Reviewing the record for errors in law,
(2) Insuring that procedures specified by law in both statute and ordinance are followed,
(3) Insuring that appropriate due process rights of a petitioner are protected including the
right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and inspect documents,
(4) Insuring that decisions of town boards are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record, and
(5) Insuring that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 626, 265 S.E.2d at 383.
33. Id.
34. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 284 N.C. at 471,202 S.E.2d at 138; see alsosupra note 32 (outlining
quasi-judicial review).
35. 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
36. Id. at 536-40, 187 S.E.2d at 37-40.
37. Id. at 535, 187 S.E.2d at 37.
38. Id. at 538, 187 S.E.2d at 39.
39. Id. at 551, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
40. Id. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45. The court gave the following definition of spot zoning:
A zoning ordinance, or amendment, which singles out and reclassifies a relatively
small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a much larger area uniformly
zoned, so as to impose upon the small tract greater restrictions than those imposed upon
the larger area, or so as to relieve the small tract from restrictions to which the rest of the
area is subjected, is called "spot zoning."
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tions for the small tract different from those that exist for the surrounding land.
In addition, the Blades court held that spot zoning is legal only if there is a
"reasonable basis" for the distinction in the zoning restrictions between the
4
small tract and the surrounding area. '
The Blades spot zoning definition seems to have caused few problems. The

only significant question is whether there is a reasonable basis for the distinction

in zoning classifications for the small tract and the surrounding area. 42 If a

reasonable basis is lacking, the trial court must invalidate the zoning amendment. The doctrine of spot zoning gives protection to neighbors of these small
tracts and allows courts to give closer review to a zoning authority's legislative
decision to rezone such property to a different zoning district.
D.

Contract Zoning and its Development in North Carolina

The doctrine of contract zoning, like the doctrine of spot zoning, allows
courts to scrutinize more closely a zoning authority's decision to rezone property. There is some debate about the exact definition of contract zoning, but at
the very least it prohibits zoning authorities from entering contracts or agreements requiring the zoning authority to rezone property. 43 Unfortunately,
many courts only apply the term "contract zoning" to a challenged rezoning
after determining that the rezoning was invalid, and thus it is difficult to estab41. Id. In Blades the court found that there was no reasonable basis for allowing the small tract
to be rezoned to a higher density allowing apartments while the surrounding neighborhood was
zoned single-family residential. Id. Thus, the zoning amendment was invalidated because it constituted impermissible spot zoning. Id. at 551, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
42. North Carolina courts have found both reasonable and unreasonable distinctions in spot
zoning cases. Although the court did not find a reasonable basis in Blades, later that same year, the
supreme court found a reasonable basis for a distinction in zoning restrictions involving a 25 acre
tract when the Town of Tarboro showed that changing conditions in the area had created a need for
commercial uses. Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 442-44, 189 S.E.2d 255, 263-64
(1972). Curiously, although Allgood was decided three months after Blades, the court only briefly
mentioned Blades and did not cite Blades for the definition of spot zoning. See also Lathan v. Union
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 47 N.C. App. 357, 357.60, 267 S.E.2d 30, 31-32 (where II acres were
rezoned from single-family residential to light industrial allowing the owners to expand their mill
operation previously operated as a non-conforming use, the court found no reasonable basis for
distinguishing this property as industrial while the surrounding area remained residential), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 92, 273 S.E.2d 298 (1980); infra text accompanying notes 97-98 & 112-14 (in Chrismon the court of appeals found no reasonable basis for the spot zoning, but the supreme court
reversed upon a finding that there was a reasonable basis for the spot zoning).
43. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.59 (1982) ("The term 'contract zoning' should probably only be applied to a true bilateral contract between the landowner and the municipality."); see
Wegner, Moving Toward the BargainingTable: ContractZoning, Development Agreements, and the
Theoretical Foundationsof Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. REV. 957, 978-980 & nn. 19-129
(1987) (listing various definitions given in court decisions, zoning treatises, and law review articles).
One writer asserts:
The term contract zoning can only be properly applied to a situation in which the
property owner provides consideration to the local governing body in the form of an enforceable promise to do or not to do a certain thing in regard to his property in return for
the zoning legislation which he seeks or an enforceable promise by the city for such legislation. In this procedure the landowner's promise is not effective until the passage of the
legislation.
Note, Contract and ConditionalZoning: A Toolfor Zoning Flexibility, 23 HAsrINGs L.J. 825, 831
(1972).
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lish a precise definition. 44 The contract zoning doctrine, however, is based on
45
the principle that zoning authorities cannot bargain away their police powers
'4 6
or "contract away the exercise of [their] zoning powers."

During the late 1970s and early 1980s the North Carolina courts developed
an unusual and broad definition of contract zoning. Interpreting the North Car-

olina Supreme Court's decision in Allred v. City of Raleigh,47 both the state
supreme court and court of appeals had held that contract zoning occurs when a

zoning authority considers a developer's proposal while making a rezoning decision pertaining to the developer's land. 48 The court of appeals had gone as far as

stating that "[i]f the rezoning is done in consideration of an assurance that a
particular tract or parcel will be developed in accordance with a restricted plan

this is contract zoning and is illegal."' 49 The courts had been concerned that a
zoning authority might not consider all of the uses that would be permitted as of
right in the new zoning classification after hearing a developer's proposed
plans.50 Using these principles, however, the court of appeals so easily found
contract zoning in subsequent cases 51 that city councils and county boards of

aldermen were afraid even to hear developers' requests before making zoning
52

amendments.

44. Wegner, supra note 43, at 979-80. "Care must be taken" in analyzing the contract zoning
cases, especially in jurisdictions that approve of some form of conditional zoning but prohibit contract zoning, because "[ain examination of the cases supports the ... view" that the terminology
"was adopted for purposes of describing the ultimate disposition of the case." Id. at 979 & n.124.
One writer asserts that the use of the contract zoning and conditional zoning terms in the decisions
"is little more than a semantic game." Kramer, ContractZoning-Old Myths andNew Realities, 34
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4, 4 (1982).
45. Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 601, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821,
439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (1981).
46. Attman/Glazer P.B. Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Annapolis, 314 Md. 675, 685, 552 A.2d
1277, 1282 (1989); see also Riverchase Homeowners Protective Ass'n v. City of Hoover, 531 So. 2d
645, 648-49 (Ala. 1988) ("'Zoning of properties by a municipality, being legislative in character,
cannot be bargained or sold.' ") (quoting Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 19, 265 So. 2d 564,
566 (1972)).
47. 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
48. Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 551, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972) (see infra notes 17684 and accompanying text for discussion of the contract zoning aspect of this decision); Willis v.
Union County, 77 N.C. App. 407, 409-10, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1985).
49. Willis, 77 N.C. App. at 409, 335 S.E.2d at 77 (emphasis added), quoted in Alderman v.
Chatham County, 89 N.C. App. 610, 618, 366 S.E.2d 885, 890, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373
S.E.2d 103 (1988).
50. Blades, 280 N.C. at 550, 187 S.E.2d at 46; Alderman, 89 N.C. App. at 619, 366 S.E.2d at
891 ("There was no determination that the Board based its rezoning on the basis that the site was
suitable for all uses permitted under MH District Zoning.").
51. See, e.g., Alderman, 89 N.C. App. at 619, 366 S.E.2d at 891; Hall v. City of Durham, 88
N.C. App. 53, 58-59, 362 S.E.2d 791, 794-96 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 323 N.C. 293, 298, 372
S.E.2d 564, 567-68 (1988) (disagreeing with the court of appeals finding of contract zoning, but
invalidating the amendment on other grounds); Godfrey v. Union County Bd. of Comm'rs, 61 N.C.

App. 100, 102-05, 300 S.E.2d 273, 274-76 (1983); see also Nelson v. City of Burlington, 80 N.C. App.
285, 290, 341 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1986) (neighbors challenged a rezoning on contract zoning grounds
and the court held that because the applicant had presented pictures of its proposed shopping center,
"there was sufficient evidence that the City Council relied on the assurances of [the applicant] that it
would use the property in a certain way rather than making a determination that all uses under the
[new district] were permissible and that therefore summary judgment [for the city] was improper").
52. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 12-13; see infra note 189.
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E. Insufficiently Analyzed Rezoning

"Insufficiently analyzed rezoning" is a term proposed in this Comment for
an as yet undenominated rezoning practice. Although the North Carolina
53
courts have cited Allred v. City of Raleigh as a precedent for contract zoning,
Allred probably should have been interpreted as prohibiting another practice
instead. The term "contract zoning" was never used in Allred.5 4 The court did,
however, invalidate the city's zoning amendment because the justices were not
convinced that the council members had considered all of the uses that would be
available to the landowner under the new zoning classification. 5" The justices
believed instead that the council had based its decision to rezone the property
solely on its approval of the developer's plans to build apartments. 56 Because

the court did not denominate this invalid zoning practice, 57 this Comment proposes the term "insufficiently analyzed rezoning," which occurs when a zoning
authority not only hears a landowner's proposed development plans, but relies

on those plans and fails to consider and to approve the tract for all of the uses
that will be permitted as of right under the new zoning classification.
F

Conditional Zoning
While spot zoning and contract zoning have provided courts with ways to

protect neighbors of rezoned property from legislative abuses, courts and legislators in several states have approved conditional zoning as a method for allowing

greater flexibility in zoning.58 Conditional zoning allows cities and counties to
apply conditions on rezoning in certain circumstances.
A 1960 case from New York was one of the first to allow a board to impose

conditions on rezoning. In Church v. Town ofslip 59 the Court of Appeals of
New York upheld a rezoning from residential to business when the property

owner consented to certain conditions regarding the use and appearance of the

lot. 60 The court concluded that reasonable restrictions should not make a zon-

ing amendment invalid, reasoning that "[t]o meet [the] increasing needs of [the
county's] own population explosion, and at the same time to make as gradual
53. See, e.g., Blades, 280 N.C. at 549-51, 187 S.E.2d at 46 (court stated that the amendment
"runs afoul of the rule stated in Allred" and later held that the amendment was invalid because it
constituted contract zoning); Hall, 88 N.C. App. at 58, 362 S.E.2d at 794 ("The basic principles of
law concerning rezoning and the prohibition against contract zoning are set forth and explained in
Allred ... and Blades .. "),aff'd on other grounds, 323 N.C. at 298, 372 S.E.2d at 567-68 (disagreeing with the court of appeals, finding of contract zoning, but invalidating the amendment on
other grounds); Willis, 77 N.C. App. at 409-10, 335 S.E.2d at 77.
54. See Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
55. Id. at 544, 178 S.E.2d at 440. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the Allred decision.
56. Allred, 277 N.C. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 440.
57. See id. at 544-45, 178 S.E.2d at 440-41.
58. See cases cited infra notes 59 & 65; see also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 277 (proposing conditional zoning); Wegner, supra note 43, at 978 n. 119 (listing articles discussing conditional zoning).
59. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
60. Id. at 257, 168 N.E.2d at 681, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The landowner consented to restrictions on the percentage of the lot that could be covered by a building as well as obligations requiring
him to erect a fence and plant shrubbery. Id.
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and as little of an annoyance as possible the change from residence to business
'61
on the main highways, the Town Board imposes conditions."
Although Church is cited as permitting conditional zoning, it is significant
to note that one of the premises of this decision-as well as most subsequent
conditional zoning cases-is that the town could have rezoned the lot to the new
district without imposing any conditions. 62 Any of the uses permitted in the
business district would have been suitable for this lot, but the town imposed the
conditions for the benefit of the neighbors in order to make the change from
residential to business as inoffensive as possible.63 The court recognized the absurdity of allowing neighbors to overturn a zoning amendment on grounds that
the conditions imposed made the zoning decision illegal when, in fact, those
64
conditions were imposed on behalf of those neighbors.
Since the Church decision, other jurisdictions have also approved some
form of conditional zoning, 65 but generally there are limitations on the flexibility
of this procedure. First, courts have distinguished valid conditional zoning from
invalid contract zoning.66 Secondly, the United States Supreme Court has held
that in certain instances, placing conditions on zoning amendments or permits
can constitute an unconstitutional taking of property. 67
G. Conditional Use Districtsand Conditional Use Zoning
Two authors, Stephen Davenport and Philip Green, have proposed using
61. Id. at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
62. Id. ("Since the Town Board could have, presumably, zoned this [tract] for business without
any restrictions, we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation.").
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ga. 709, 235 S.E.2d 379 (1977); Bucholz v. City of
Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d
207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970);
see also Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 599-603, 421 N.E.2d 818,
821-22, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328-30 (1981) (the court reviewed its Church decision and again approved
conditional zoning). In many of these decisions, the courts have based their approval of conditional
zoning on the same premise stated in Church: the rezoning to a new district would be permissible
without the conditions, and the conditions are imposed on behalf of the neighbors. See, eg., Cross,
238 Ga. at 713, 235 S.E.2d at 382 (conditional zoning upheld when the conditions are imposed "to
ameliorate the effects of the zoning change"); Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 278 (neighbors were not harmed because "everything that is to be done under the agreement could be done
without such an agreement"); Collard,52 N.Y.2d at 600-01, 421 N.E.2d at 821, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 329
("if it is initially proper to change a zoning classification without the imposition of restrictive conditions," then imposing conditions should not automatically invalidate the rezoning).

66. See, e.g., Cross, 238 Ga. at 713, 235 S.E.2d at 382-83 (conditional zoning is generally valid
but it is invalid "where the zoning board is motivated to allow the change by the conditions offered
or proposed by the rezoning applicant, so that the rezoning is granted as a consequence of the
conditions rather than as an exercise of legislative discretion"); Collard, 52 N.Y.2d at 601, 421
N.E.2d at 821-22, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 329-30 ("absent proof of a contract purporting to bind the local
legislature in advance to exercise its zoning authority in a bargained-for manner," conditional zoning
is permissible); Zupancic, 46 Wis. 2d at 30, 174 N.W.2d at 538 (when a zoning authority "makes an
agreement with a landowner to rezone," this is invalid contract zoning, but when the city is not
obligated to rezone, conditions and agreements do not constitute "contract zoning in the true sense
and [do] not vitiate the zoning if it is otherwise valid").
67. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); see also Collard,52 N.Y.2d
at 602-03, 421 N.E.2d at 822, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 330 (court should invalidate the zoning amendment if
the conditions imposed are unreasonable).
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conditional use districts in North Carolina. 68 No uses are permitted as of right
for property in a conditional use district; the landowner must apply for and
receive a conditional use permit before he is authorized to use his property for
any purpose.69 The legislature only recently granted authority to cities and
counties to create such districts throughout North Carolina, 70 stipulating that

property may be placed in a conditional use district only when the property
owner applies for such a rezoning.7 1 The legislation also provided, as the designers of the conditional use district concept had envisioned, that uses in a conditional use '72
district "are permitted only upon the issuance of a ...conditional
use permit."

The technique of rezoning to a conditional use district is called conditional
use zoning. 73 The creators of the conditional use district concept suggest that

74
zoning ordinances be amended to provide for a whole new set of districts.

"For simplicity," they suggest that "these districts duplicate exactly the existing
68. See S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 6-7.
69. Most landowners probably will submit applications for a rezoning to a conditional use district and for a conditional use permit at the same time. See, e.g., Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 614-15, 370
S.E.2d at 581-82.
70. The zoning statutes were amended in 1985 to allow conditional use districts. Act of July 4,
1985, ch. 607, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 776 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342, 160A-382
(1987)). These statutes now specifically authorize cities and counties to create zoning districts that
may include, but shall not be limited to, general use districts, in which a variety of uses are
permissible in accordance with general standards ... and special use districts or conditional use districts, in which uses are permitted only upon the issuance of a special use
permit or a conditional use permit.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-342 (1987) (granting districting authority to counties); see also id. § 160A382 (same authority granted to cities). The terms "conditional use district" and "special use dis.
trict" are the creations of Mr. Davenport and Professor Green. See S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN,
supra note 3, at 6-7. Several localities lobbied for and were granted authority to use conditional use
districts by special acts passed by the legislature more than a decade before the legislature granted
that authority state-wide. See Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 381, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 445-47 (Winston
Salem and Forsyth County); Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 485, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 665-66 (Surry
County); Act of April 11, 1974, ch. 1283, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d sess. 461 (Charlotte and Mecklenburg County). Other cities and some commentators believed that such authority was already
implicit within the standard zoning act provisions. Green, Two Major Zoning Decisions: Chrismon
v. Guilford County and Hall v. City of Durham, 34 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW BULLETIN 2 (N.C.
Inst. of Gov't., Nov. 1988); see also S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that
conditional use district ordinances had been enacted in Greensboro, Statesville, and Guilford County
without any special statutory provision). This assumption turned out to be correct as the North
Carolina Supreme Court approved conditional use zoning in Chrismon even though the case arose
before the 1985 statutory provisions for conditional use districts and even though Guilford County
had no special legislative provisions. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 619-22, 370 S.E.2d at 584-86 (quoting S.
DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 9, and concluding that authority for such a practice was
included in the general zoning statutes).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1987) ("Property may be placed in a special use district or
conditional use district only in response to a petition by the owners of all the property to be included."); see also id. § 153A-342 (same limitation for counties); S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra
note 3, at 14 (noting that one system in use provides that the process must be initiated by the
applicant).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-342 (1987) (granting districting authority to counties); see also id.

§ 160A-382 (same authority granted to cities).

73. The Chrismon court adopted this term. 322 N.C. at 614-17, 370 S.E.2d at 581-83. The
creators of the conditional use district concept also used the terms "CUD procedure" (conditional
use district procedure), "CUD technique," "CUD system," and "CUD approach." S.DAVENPORT
& P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 6, 7, 17 & 20.
74. S.DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 7.
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set of districts, except that they are denominated [Conditional] Use Districts." '75
Thus, for each general use district, there would be a corresponding conditional
use district in which no uses are permitted as of right and in which conditional
use permits are required for any use. 7 6 Conditional use permits for property in a
conditional use district "can be issued allowing any of the uses permitted (either
as permitted uses or as [conditional] uses) in the counterpart [general use] district."' 7 7 Thus, if a general use district, for example an R-10 district, permits
fifteen uses as of right and provides for eight other enumerated conditional uses,
then the corresponding conditional use district, CU-R-10, would have no uses
permitted as of right, but would have a list of twenty-three conditional uses
representing the fifteen permitted uses from the general use district that would
now be conditional uses plus the eight conditional uses. If the owner applies for
and receives rezoning to a conditional use district and obtains a conditional use
permit, but later wants to have another use allowed for her property, she must
return to the zoning authority to seek rezoning to another district-either a general use district or another conditional use district--or seek an amendment to
her conditional use permit. 78 Mr. Davenport and Professor Green also assert
that another feature of a conditional use district application is that a developer
may present his plans to the zoning authority as it makes the decision, which
some people believed was not allowed in rezoning decisions involving different
79
general use districts under the extension of contract zoning in North Carolina.

II.
A.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS:

CHRISMON AND HALL

Chrismon v. Guilford County

The situation that provoked the lawsuit in Chrismon v. Guilford County8 °
began in 1948 when Bruce Clapp began a business adjacent to his home in rural
Guilford County, North Carolina, storing grain and selling fertilizer and agricultural chemicals to local farmers.8 1 Subsequently, in 1964, Guilford County
adopted a zoning ordinance that zoned Mr. Clapp's property and many acres
surrounding his property as "A-1 Agricultural." 8 2 In an A-1 Agricultural district, drying and storing grain were uses specifically listed in the zoning ordinance as permitted as of right.8 3 However, the remaining part of Mr. Clapp's
business, involving the sale and distribution of "lime, fertilizer, pesticides, and
other agricultural chemicals," was not listed as a use permitted as of right in this
75. Id. The authors suggested Special Use Districts for use in conjunction with special use
permits and Conditional Use Districts for use in conjunction with conditional use permits. Id. at 6-8.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 8; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342 & 160A-382 (in conditional use districts,
"uses are permitted only upon the issuance of a. .. conditional use permit"); Green, supra note 70,
at 2 (describing the landowner's options).
79. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 8; see supra notes 47-52 and infra notes 16690 and accompanying texts.
80. 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
81. Id. at 613, 370 S.E.2d at 581.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 613-14, 370 S.E.2d at 581.
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district. 84 Because Mr. Clapp's business predated the zoning ordinance, he was

allowed to continue selling chemicals and fertilizer as a "nonconforming use"

'
"so long as [the sales] were not expanded." 85
Mr. Clapp continued to sell chem-

icals and to conduct the rest of his business until 1980, when he moved some of
his business across the street and expanded his operation. 86 His neighbors, the
plaintiffs, objected to this expansion, whereupon the County Inspections Department notified him that he no longer had the benefit of the nonconforming use
87
because he had expanded the sales of agricultural chemicals.
Pursuant to information provided to him by the Inspections Department,

Mr. Clapp applied to have the tracts on which he was operating his business
rezoned from A-1 Agricultural to a Conditional Use Industrial District (CU-M2).88 At the same time, he applied for a conditional use permit. 89 Although

there were eighty-six uses permitted as of right in the general use M-2 Industrial
district, 90 the only use he wanted to take advantage of was the sale of agricultural chemicals; all of his other operations were permissible under the then ex-

isting zoning classification. 9' After appropriate notice and a public hearing in
which several people spoke in favor of the rezoning and indicated that farmers in
the vicinity benefited from Mr. Clapp's business, 92 the Guilford County Board
of Commissioners voted to rezone the tracts to CU-M-2 and approved Mr.
93
Clapp's application for a conditional use permit.

The Chrismons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the zoning
amendment "was unlawful and therefore void." '94 The trial court found that

Mr. Clapp's sale of agricultural chemicals was "compatible with the agricultural
needs of the surrounding area" and that the rezoning was neither spot zoning
nor contract zoning. 95 Thus, the trial court concluded that the county had not
84. Id. at 614, 370 S.E.2d at 581.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Mr. Clapp owned several small tracts. The tract to which he expanded his business was
across the street from his residence and the original site of the business. It was also adjacent to the
Chrismon's property. The Chrismons purchased their property from Mr. Clapp in 1969 and built
their home there. Id.
88. Id. at 614-15, 370 S.E.2d at 581-82.
89. Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582. In the application for the conditional use permit, Mr. Clapp
specified the uses he wished to make of his land. Id.
90. Petition for Discretionary Review at 5, Chrismon (No. 232PA87) ("[I1f the subject property had been rezoned to the general purpose district of M-2 the County Commissioners would have
had to determine that all eighty-six (86) uses permitted in an M-2 district would be appropriate for
the subject property."); see also Record at 39-46, Chrismon (No. 232PA87) (table listing the uses
permitted in each district in Guilford County at that time). Among the uses permitted as of right in
an M-2 district were chemical manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, textile manufacturing, tobacco manufacturing, motor freight transportation and warehousing, fuel dealerships, and automobile repair shops. Id.
91. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 613-15, 370 S.E.2d at 581-82.
92. Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582. The board also received a petition signed by 88 persons
favoring the rezoning. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court added that while "it was the Chrismons alone who lived next door to the operation, we do note that it was the Chrismons, and no one
else, who spoke up against the rezoning." Id. at 630, 370 S.E.2d at 590.
93. Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582.
94. Id. at 613, 370 S.E.2d at 581.
95. Id. at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582.
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acted arbitrarily and upheld the rezoning 96
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rezoning
was illegal spot zoning because it could find no reasonable basis for rezoning this
small tract of land with restrictions different from those that applied to the land
immediately surrounding it. 9 7 As an alternative ground for its holding, the
court of appeals found that the zoning amendment was illegal and void because
it constituted contract zoning. 98 Significantly, the court based its finding of contract zoning on the fact that the county had not considered and approved the
tract for all of the uses permitted in a general use M-2 Industrial district and
held that the requirements of valid rezoning are "not satisfied by the finding of a

reasonable basis for a zoning change in the particular use or uses which the
applicant intends to apply the rezoned property." 99
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. t ° ° The supreme court ap-

proved conditional use zoning, 10 1 even though this case arose before the legislature had given all counties and cities the express authority to use conditional use
districts.' 0 2 Citing several commentators, the court asserted that conditional

use zoning is "exceedingly valuable" because it gives zoning authorities "greater
10 3
flexibility in balancing conflicting demands."
In Chrismon the supreme court contended that it was joining a growing

number of jurisdictions that allow conditional use zoning.104 Despite its citation

of cases and statutes from a large number of states,105 however, the court did not
96. Id.
97. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 85 N.C. App. 211, 216-18, 354 S.E.2d 309, 312-13 (1987),
rey'd, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). The court of appeals considered three factors in determining whether there was a reasonable basis for the rezoning: (1) whether there had been changes in
the area that necessitated rezoning; (2) the characteristics of the area rezoned; and (3) the zoning
classification and development of nearby land. Id. For a discussion of spot zoning, see supra notes
35-42 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 219, 354 S.E.2d at 314. For discussion of contract zoning, see supra notes 43-52 and
accompanying text.
99. Id. at 218, 354 S.E.2d at 314. The uses permitted in a general use M-2 zoning district
"include, among other things, manufacturing facilities of virtually any kind, fuel oil dealerships,
waste recycling facilities, and public utility storage depots." Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 619 n.2, 370
S.E.2d at 584 n.2.
100. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 639-40, 370 S.E.2d at 596.
101. Id. at 618-22, 370 S.E.2d at 583-86. For a definition of conditional use zoning, see supra
notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
102. Act of July 4, 1985, ch. 607, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 776 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 153A-342, 160A-382 (1987)). This rezoning occurred December 20, 1982. Chrismon, 322 N.C.
at 615, 370 S.E.2d at 582.
103. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 618, 370 S.E.2d at 584. One of the passages cited by the court
explained that:
Conditional zoning is an outgrowth of the need for compromise between the interests of the
developer seeking appropriate zoning changes for his tract, and the neighboring landowner
whose property interests would suffer if the most intensive use permitted by the new classification were instituted. In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting pressures, the municipality will authorize the proposed change but minimize its adverse effects by imposing
conditions.
Id. (quoting Shapiro, supra note 4, at 280).
104. Id. at 620-21, 370 S.E.2d at 585.
105. In a footnote, the court cited cases and statutes from fifteen other states. Id. at 620 n.3, 370
S.E.2d at 585 n.3. Some of these cases are discussed below, but it is important to note that the form
of conditional zoning approved in other jurisdictions differs from the practice approved in this case.
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join a growing trend. Many of the cases cited are cases that approve of condi-

tional zoning, not conditional use zoning. Conditional zoning occurs when the
rezoning of property to a new district would be reasonable and completely per-

missible, but the zoning authority imposes conditions on the rezoning in order to
ameliorate the effects of the rezoning on neighbors.106 Conditional use zoning,

on the other hand, appears to be unique to North Carolina and occurs when a
zoning authority rezones property to a conditional use district in which no uses
are permitted as of right and in which a landowner must have a conditional use
10 7
permit approving every use for which she uses her property.
The Chrismon court was convinced that conditional use zoning would be a
valuable addition to zoning alternatives,' 08 but the court cautioned that the
practice could be "easily abused." 10 9 Thus, the court explained that "condi-

tional use zoning, like any type of zoning, must be reasonable, neither arbitrary
nor unduly discriminatory, and in the public interest."' 10 The court also
warned that a conditional use rezoning amendment also should not "constitute
illegal spot zoning or illegal contract zoning."'

On the issue of spot zoning, the court disagreed with the court of appeals.
The court found a reasonable basis for the rezoning and thus concluded that this
rezoning was not illegal spot zoning.' 12 After listing several factors that courts
should consider in determining whether a zoning amendment constitutes invalid
spot zoning,' 13 the court decided that there was a reasonable justification for the
rezoning in this case because of the degree of public benefit created by the zoning
Compare the definition of conditional zoning, supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text, with the
definition of conditional use zoning, supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text. The court cited a
Wisconsin case in this footnote, but the case cited had nothing to do with conditional zoning, See
Howard v. Village of Elm Grove, 80 Wis. 2d 33, 257 N.W.2d 850 (1977) (considering spot zoning),
cited in Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 620 n.3, 370 S.E.2d at 585 n.3. The court was correct, however, in
citing Wisconsin as a jurisdiction that has approved conditional zoning because another Wisconsin
case cited later by the court in Chrismon did indeed approve of conditional zoning. See State ex rel.
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 30, 174 N.W.2d 533, 538 (1970), cited in Chrismon, 322 N.C.
at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587.
106. See definition supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text and see cases discussed infra notes
209-15 and accompanying text.
107. See definition supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
108. The court reasoned that:
[Tihe practice, when properly implemented, will add a valuable and desirable flexibility to
the planning efforts of local authorities throughout our state. In our view, the "all or
nothing" approach of traditional zoning techniques is insufficient in today's world of rapid
industrial expansion and pressing urban and rural social and economic problems.
Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586 (citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586.
111. Id. at 623, 370 S.E.2d at 586.
112. Id. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 588.
113. The court cited several factors to consider in spot zoning challenges:
Among the factors relevant to this judicial balancing are the size of the tract in question;
the compatibility of the disputed zoning action with an existing comprehensive zoning
plan; the benefits and detriments resulting from the zoning action for the owner of the
newly zoned property, his neighbors, and the surrounding community; and the relationship
between the uses envisioned under the new zoning and the uses currently present in adjacent tracts.
Id. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 589.
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action here and the similarity of the proposed use of the tracts under the new
114

conditional use zone to the uses in the surrounding A-1 agricultural area.
Thus, the court found that the spot zoning in this case was valid spot zoning.
The Chrismon court also disagreed with the court of appeals on the issue of
contract zoning, contending that the lower court's approach "outlawed conditional use zoning" by equating it with contract zoning.1 15 The court of appeals
had held that a county zoning board must consider all uses that are permissible
under the new zoning district regardless of whether the proposed rezoning is to a
general use district or to a conditional use district.11 6 In their amici curiae brief,
the cities of Charlotte and Greensboro argued that there should be no reason to
consider all permissible uses because "[u]ses are authorized only upon approval
of a conditional use permit ....
Furthermore, if the land is suited to all uses
allowed in the corresponding general use district, there would be little reason to
provide for conditional use zones." 1 17 Persuaded by this argument, 118 the
supreme court distinguished general use district rezoning from conditional use
rezoning. While a zoning authority must determine that property is appropriate
for all of the uses permitted as of right before rezoning to a general use district,
the court held that "it is not necessary that property rezoned to a conditional use
district be available for all of the uses allowed under the corresponding general
use district."' 19
The court also distinguished conditional use zoning from contract zoning
on two grounds: first, conditional use zoning is not a bilateral agreement between the zoning authority and the landowner, whereas contract zoning requires
such a bilateral agreement; and second, in "conditional use zoning, the local
zoning authority maintains its independent decision-making authority, while in
the contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a zoning amendment."' 20 The court
found no evidence that the county had "entered into anything approaching a
114. Id. at 630-31, 370 S.E.2d at 591.
115. Id. at 634, 370 S.E.2d at 593 (The court called contract zoning "a practice universally

considered illegal.").
116. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 85 N.C. App. 211, 218, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1987), rev'd,
322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). The court of appeals had held that "in order to properly
rezone the area to a conditional use district, the zoning authority initially must determine that the
property, under the new zoning classification, is suitable for all the uses permitted in its corresponding [general use] district." Id.

117. Amici Curiae Brief (City of Greensboro and City of Charlotte) at 10, Chrismon (No.
232PA87).

118. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587 ("[I]f a given tract of land is suited to all uses
allowed in the corresponding general use district ... the purposes served, and the benefits provided
by, conditional use districts would be negated entirely.").

119. Id. at 624-25, 370 S.E.2d at 587. It is curious that the court used the word "available" in
this holding because property rezoned to a conditional use district, by definition, never has any uses
available for it without a conditional use permit. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342 & 160A-382
(1987); see supra text accompanying note 72. From the context of the discussion in Chrismon, it is
likely that the court intended to hold that in rezoning to a conditional use district, the property need
not be suitable or appropriate for all of the uses permitted under the corresponding general use
district. Just prior to this statement, the court had phrased its discussion and examples in terms of
whether the property "must be suitable for all uses" allowed under the corresponding general use
district. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 623-24, 370 S.E.2d at 587 (emphasis added).
120. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 636, 370 S.E.2d at 594.
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bilateral contract with the landowner" 1 2 1 in this case and found that the rezoning was not contract zoning because it was accomplished through deliberation
22
and legislative approval rather than through a contract.'
Justice Webb dissented, accusing the majority of overruling Blades and Allred without specifically stating so. 123 He compared the processes by which rezoning was accomplished in Blades and Allred with the process by which

rezoning was accomplished in Chrismon, and concluded that the processes were
that under those prior cases,
essentially the same. 124 Justice Webb then asserted
1 25
this process constituted "contract zoning."

B. Hall v. City of Durham
Only ten weeks after approving conditional use zoning in Chrismon, the
North Carolina Supreme Court decided another significant zoning case, Hall v.
City of Durham.126 The suit arose when the owner of a 12.9 acre tract, B,K,B,

Inc., and the Lowe's Investment Corporation (Lowe's) applied to have the tract
rezoned to C-4(D)--a general use district that allowed heavy commercial
uses. 12 7 At that time, the property was divided between two districts: half was
zoned neighborhood commercial (C-I) and the other half single family residential (R-20).1 28 The area surrounding the property was zoned for residential and
commercial uses, but Lowe's wanted the property rezoned to a heavy commercial district in order to construct and operate a "Home Center," which would
29
include a lumber yard and several sales buildings.'
121. Id. at 636-37, 370 S.E.2d at 594.
122. Id. at 637-39, 370 S.E.2d at 594-96.
123. Id. at 641-42, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting). Justice Mitchell also dissented. Id.
at 640, 370 S.E.2d at 596 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The two justices also joined each other's opinions. For discussion of the contract zoning aspects of the Blades and Allred decisions, see supra
notes 47-48 and accompanying text and infra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
124. See infra note 125.
125. Justice Webb explained his reasoning:
In [Blades and Allred] the landowner submitted plans for the buildings he would construct
if the change was made. The City Council in each case rezoned the property as requested
by the landowner. This Court in each case held this was illegal contract zoning. There was
no more evidence in either case that there was a bilateral contract or any reciprocal
promises than there is in this case. There was no more evidence in those cases than there is
in this case that the zoning board abandoned its independent decision making authority.
In my opinion Blades and Allred are indistinguishable from this case.
Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 642, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting). However, Justice Webb did not
quote Allred or Blades or cite a particular page of either of those opinions to define contract zoning.
As discussed previously, the court in Allred did not identify the practice invalidated in that case as
contract zoning, and it is appropriate to distinguish insufficiently analyzed rezoning from contract
zoning. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of an unusual doctrine of contract zoning in North Carolina; see supra notes 53-57 for the definition of insufficiently analyzed rezoning; and see infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text for the distinction
between contract zoning and insufficiently analyzed rezoning.
In his separate dissent Justice Mitchell argued that at the time of its action in this case, the
county did not have legislative authority to participate in this sort of zoning. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at
640-41, 370 S.E.2d at 596-97 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
126. 323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
127. Id. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
128. Id.
129. Id.

1989]

ZONING

Lowe's submitted a development plan to the City of Durham with its rezoning application.1 30 In addition to the proposed physical site layout showing how

it would construct the buildings, Lowe's submitted some unusual additional proposals.13 1 Lowe's indicated that at the time of construction it would deed an

adjacent nine-acre tract to the Eno River Association, a local environmental
protection association. 132 The development plan also indicated that when the
property was deeded from B,K,B, Inc. to Lowe's, the deed would include a re-

verter clause "stating that if Lowe's ceased to use the property for a lumberyard
and home center, the title would vest in the Eno River Association, or if the Eno

River Association no longer existed, then in the City of Durham." 133 Thus,
Lowe's intended to assure the City Council and the neighboring property owners

that it was willing to use the property in the manner in which it had proposed
and that the council and the neighbors need not worry about the other uses
permitted in a C-4(D) district. The Durham City Council approved the rezoning; neighboring property owners then challenged the zoning amendment on
134
grounds that it was illegal contract zoning.

The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs because it found
that the rezoning was contract zoning and therefore illegal and void. 135 The
court of appeals affirmed, 136 asserting that "rezoning is proper only when the

surrounding circumstances justify making the property available for all uses per-

missible under the particular classification."' t 37 In this case, the court observed
that "nothing in the record indicates that the Council even considered the suitability of this parcel of land for any of the other uses permitted in a C-4 district,
such as adult entertainment, correctional institutions, crematoria, heavy equipment sales and storage, or bulk storage of flammable liquids and gases."' 138 The

court of appeals explained that Blades and Allred stand "for the broad[ ] principles that property may not be rezoned in reliance upon any representations of
the applicant and that rezoning must take into account all permitted uses under
139
the new classification."
130. Id. The City of Durham has special legislative authority to require submission of development plans along with requests for rezoning. In addition, the special legislation allows the Durham
City Council to consider the development plan when making the rezoning decision. Id. at 304-05,
372 S.E.2d at 571 (citing Act effective June 18, 1975, ch. 671, § 92, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 815, 863).
131. Id. at 295-96, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
132. Id. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
133. Id. at 295-96, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
134. Id. at 294, 372 S.E.2d at 565-66. Plaintiffs also challenged the rezoning on other grounds:
(1) that a valid protest petition by neighbors had triggered the three-fourths majority vote needed for
approval of zoning action as stipulated in the state statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-385 (1987),
and (2) that the rezoning was not in accordance with the city's comprehensive plan for development.
Hall, 323 N.C. at 294, 372 S.E.2d at 565-66. However, the trial court ruled for the city on the
question involving the protest petition, and plaintiffs abandoned their claim involving the comprehensive plan. Id. at 294-95, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
135. Hall, 323 N.C. at 294, 372 S.E.2d at 566.
136. Hall v. City of Durham, 88 N.C. App. 53, 58-59, 362 S.E.2d 791, 794-95 (1987), aff'd on
other grounds, 323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
137. Id. at 58-59, 362 S.E.2d at 794.
138. Id. at 59, 362 S.E.2d at 795.

139. Id. at 61, 362 S.E.2d at 795.
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Although affirming the court of appeals decision on other grounds, the
North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed that the council's action amounted to
contract zoning. 14° It found the council's rezoning was invalid because the
council did not consider all of the uses that would be available to Lowe's when
the property was rezoned to C-4(D). t4 1 Following Chrismon so closely, Hall
gave the court a second opportunity to redefine contract zoning, establish when
a zoning board must consider all of the uses that will be available to the property
owner when the property is rezoned, and distinguish conditional use districts
from general use districts.
42
In clarifying its definition of contract zoning as set forth in Chrismon,'
the court stated that "impermissible ...contract zoning depends upon a finding
of a transaction in which both the landowner seeking a rezoning and the zoning
authority undertake reciprocal obligations. In short, a 'meeting of the minds'
must occur; mutual assurances must be exchanged."' 143 As an example of con-

tract zoning, the court described a situation in which an applicant promises to
use the property only for certain purposes, and in return the zoning authority
promises to rezone the property and refrain from changing the zoning classification again for a certain length of time. 144
The supreme court also explained that the court of appeals had relied inappropriately on Allred 145 when it rendered its Chrismon decision,1 46 because Chrismon involved a conditional use district and Allred involved rezoning to a
general use district. The court added that the court of appeals in Hall properly
relied upon Allred because both Hall and Allred involved general use districts.' 4 7 Thus, repeating the concerns expressed in Allred, the court warned
that if the property were rezoned to a C-4(D) district, Lowe's or a future owner
could use the property in any of the ways permitted in the zoning ordinance
despite the current promises.148 Reviewing the record before it, the court found
the zoning invalid because the council had not considered all of the uses permitted in the C-4(D) district.14 9 Thus, the court followed its Allred holding that the
zoning authority must consider all of the uses that will be available under the
district classification when considering rezoning to a general use district.' 50 By
invalidating the zoning amendment, the court followed the principles of insufficiently analyzed rezoning. It departed from the court of appeals' view by deter140. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298, 372 S.E.2d at 567-68.
141. Id. at 298, 372 S.E.2d at 567-68. This amounts to insufficiently analyzed rezoning. For a
definition of this proposed term, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
142. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593.
143. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 568.
144. Id. at 299, 372 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Shapiro, supra note 4, at 269).
145. For a description of the Allred case and the relevance of its holding, see supra notes 47-48
and infra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 98-99 & 115-19 and accompanying text.
147. Hall, 323 N.C. at 301, 372 S.E.2d at 569. For a definition of general use districts, see supra
notes 19-24 and accompanying text.

148. Hall, 323 N.C. at 303, 372 S.E.2d at 571. These same concerns were expressed in Allred.
See AlIred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (1971).
149. Hall, 323 N.C. at 303-04, 372 S.E.2d at 571.
150. Id. at 305, 372 S.E.2d at 572; see Allred, 277 N.C. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 440-41.
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mining that this was not contract zoning because the council and the landowner
15 1
had not entered into reciprocal obligations.
III.
A.

SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS OF THE CHRISMON AND HALL DECISIONS

Adjustment in the FactorsDetermining the Permissibilityof Spot Zoning

In the area of spot zoning,' 5 2 the court in Chrismon restated the definition
set forth in Blades 153 and continued to distinguish between illegal spot zoning
and legal spot zoning. 154 The Chrismon court did not change prior law, but it
did establish a set of factors for trial courts to consider when determining
whether there is a reasonable justification for spot zoning.155 The factors set
forth by the supreme court in Chrismon are not drastically different from the
factors considered by the court of appeals in that case. 156 The supreme court

directed trial courts to consider "the benefits and detriments resulting from the
zoning action for the owner of the newly zoned property, his neighbors, and the
surrounding community."' 157 The Chrismon court noted that if only the owner
of a rezoned property receives a great benefit while a neighbor receives a detri-

ment, the rezoning "may well be illegal, [but] spot zoning which provides a service needed in the community in addition to benefitting the landowner may be
proper."'15 8 The court, therefore, placed great emphasis upon whether there is a
59
public need for the spot zoning.'
By finding that the spot zoning was supported by a reasonable justification,

the court in Chrismon established a standard by which trial courts will compare
future cases. These trial courts may be expected to place heavy emphasis upon
the benefits to the community of the uses permitted in the spot zoning. Petitions

like the one signed by Mr. Clapp's neighbors in the Chrismon case may provide
151. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 567-68.
Justices Webb and Mitchell differed with the majority, as they had done in Chrismon. Concurring in Hall, they again expressed concern that the majority was overruling Allred and Blades without expressly saying so. Id. at 306, 372 S.E.2d at 572 (Webb, J., concurring). They contended that
"the majority has eliminated the ban on contract zoning in this state. This is regrettable because it
can be a useful tool in protecting property owners from exceptions to the zoning laws which protect
their property." Id. (Webb, J., concurring) (for a discussion of their dissenting opinions in Chrismon,see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text).
152. For a definition of spot zoning, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
153. Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972). For a discussion of
spot zoning and the Blades case, see supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text. Spot zoning involves
zoning small parcels of land with restrictions different from those placed on surrounding land; it is
illegal where there is not a sufficient or reasonable justification for the distinction in restrictions.
154. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 626-27, 370 S.E.2d at 588-89.
155. Id. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 589. See supra note 113 for the factors that the court listed.
156. The court of appeals considered (1) whether there is an "indication of any change in conditions which would justify the rezoning," (2) "the particular characteristics of the area being rezoned," and (3) "the classification and development of nearby land." Chrismon v. Guilford County,
85 N.C. App. 211, 216-17, 354 S.E.2d 309, 312-13 (1987), rev'd, 322 N.C. 611, 625, 370 S.E.2d 578,
588 (1988). Compare this list with the list of factors given by the supreme court, supra note 113.
157. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 589.
158. Id. at 629, 370 S.E.2d at 590.
159. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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substantial support for finding that there is a great community benefit derived
from rezoning.
For city councils and county boards of commissioners, the Chrismon decision probably will not have a great impact as far as spot zoning is concerned.
They must still be careful to produce a record showing reasonable justifications
when rezoning small tracts of land to new classifications that are different from
the surrounding properties.
B.

Redefining ContractZoning and Maintainingthe ProhibitionAgainst
Insufficiently Analyzed Rezoning

After a pair of zoning decisions by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
1971160 and 1972161 and prior to the decisions in Chrismon and Hall, North
Carolina courts developed an unusually broad definition of contract zoning.
This section will recount the development of that "contract zoning" doctrine
while paying particular attention to the actual holdings of, and evils sought to be
avoided with, the 1971 and 1972 decisions.1 62 This section then will describe
how the supreme court redefined contract zoning in Chrismon and Hall to bring
the contract zoning doctrine in North Carolina closer to the doctrine as it exists
in other states 163 while retaining the prohibition against insufficiently analyzed
164
rezoning that the court originally condemned in its 1971 and 1972 decisions.
Finally, this section will discuss the practical effects of this alteration of the
contract zoning doctrine and conclude that the court's decisions in Chrismon
and Hall give greater freedoms to zoning authorities but still retain protections
165
against egregious zoning practices.
North Carolina's unusual doctrine of contract zoning began with the 1971
decision in Allred v. City of Raleigh. 166 In Allred a landowner requested that the
Raleigh City Council rezone his property from R-4 to R-1016 7 so that he could
construct luxury high-rise apartment buildings.16 8 The City Council granted his
request and rezoned the property, but the neighbors challenged the legality of
the rezoning amendment. 16 9 The North Carolina Supreme Court declared the
rezoning amendment invalid because the City Council, in rendering its decision,
did not consider whether the circumstances surrounding the property in ques-

tion "justified the rezoning of the 9.26-acre tract so as to permit all uses permis160. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
161. Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
162. See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
166. 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
167. Both districts were general use districts, but the R-10 district permitted several uses that
were not permitted as of right in an R-4 district: hospitals, rest homes, "[a] customary home occupation incidental to the occupancy of the home as a dwelling," boardinghouses, civic clubs, and
other uses. Id. at 543, 178 S.E.2d at 439.
168. Id. at 536, 178 S.E.2d at 435.
169. Id. at 532, 178 S.E.2d at 433.
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sible in an R-10 district."170 Instead, the council based its decision to rezone the
property solely on its approval of the proposed apartment high-rises. 171 In hold-

ing that the council must consider all of the uses permitted as of right on the
property if rezoned, 172 the court expressed concern that, if it were to hold other-

wise, once the property was rezoned the owner would "be legally entitled to
make any use" of the property that was permissible in the R-10 district, and the

developer would not be bound to construct the high-rises as he had represented
before the council. 173 Although the court invalidated the zoning amendment

because the council had not considered all of the permissible uses in the new
zoning classification, the court did not use the term "contract zoning" in its

opinion. 174 Ironically, this case stood as the cornerstone of the contract zoning
175
doctrine in North Carolina for fifteen years.
One year after Allred, in Blades v. City of Raleigh 176 the same city council
rezoned a five-acre tract to allow a developer to build twenty luxury apart-

ments. 177 The supreme court not only held that the zoning amendment constituted impermissible spot zoning, 178 but also added an alternative ground for
overturning this rezoning by stating that the zoning amendment in Blades "runs

afoul of the rule stated in Allred."'i7 9 Quoting extensively from Allred, the court
in Blades found that the Raleigh City Council again had approved a rezoning to
a new general use district after hearing the developer's plans without considering
all of the uses permissible in the new district.' 80 The court invalidated the zoning amendment because the amendment "constitute[d] unlawful 'spot zoning'
and unlawful 'contractzoning.' "181 This was a significant conclusion, but it
may have been worded improperly. Although the court was justified in finding
spot zoning and in finding that the procedure by which the Blades amendment

was adopted violated the rule set forth in Allred (that a zoning authority must
consider and approve of all of the uses available as of right in the new district),
170. Id. at 544, 178 S.E.2d at 440.
171. Id. at 544-45, 178 S.E.2d at 440.
172, The court specifically held that:
[T]he zoning of the property may be changed from R-4 to R-10 only if and when its location and the surrounding circumstances are such that the property should be made available for all uses permitted in an R-10 district. Rezoning on consideration of assurances
that a particular tract or parcel will be developed in accordance with restricted approved
plans is not a permissible ground for placing the property in a zone where restrictions of
the nature prescribed are not otherwise required or contemplated. Rezoning must be effected by the exercise of legislative power rather than by special arrangements with the
owner of a particular tract or parcel of land.
Id. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 440-41.
173. Id. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 440.
174. See Allred, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
175. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
176. 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
177. Id. at 536-40, 187 S.E.2d at 38-40.
178. Id. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45. For discussion of this case in regard to spot zoning, see supra
notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 549-50, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
180. Id. at 550, 187 S.E.2d at 46.
181. Id. at 551, 187 S.E.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
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the term "contract zoning" had not been used at all in Allred 182 and had not
been defined in Blades.183 Despite the court's failure to define contract zoning

in either decision, this concluding statement in Blades established a lasting asso84
ciation of the practice prohibited in Allred with the term "contract zoning."'
After Allred and Blades, the North Carolina Court of Appeals developed a
much looser standard for finding contract zoning-a standard that left zoning
authorities in a difficult position. The court of appeals has insisted "that prop-

erty may not be rezoned in reliance upon any representations of the applicant
and that rezoning must take into account all permitted uses under the new clas-

sification."' 185 The court was justifiably concerned that zoning authorities consider all uses that would be permitted as of right under a new zoning

classification.18 6 On the other hand, the court was unnecessarily quick to label a
zoning procedure as invalid contract zoning when it believed that the zoning
authority had not considered sufficiently all of the uses to be permitted in the
new zoning classification. 187 As a result, the court of appeals found contract
zoning when the applicant merely mentioned to the board of commissioners or

city council what his plans were for the property after it was rezoned.' 8 8 This
holding left boards and councils in the position of having to refuse to hear what
plans a developer had designed when it considered a request to rezone property
to a different general use district.' 8 9 A zoning authority could have avoided this
182. See Allred, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
183. See Blades, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
184. When courts and attorneys later interpreted Blades, it was reasonable to associate contract
zoning with the practice of rezoning a parcel after hearing development plans without considering all
of the uses permissible in the new classification-the practice overturned in both Alired and Blades.
This association was reasonable because the court found the zoning amendment invalid for two
reasons: first, the amendment constituted spot zoning; and second, the amendment ran "afoul of the
rule stated in Allred." Id. at 551, 187 S.E.2d at 46. When the court listed violations of spot zoning
and contract zoning in its conclusion, therefore, one reasonably could conclude that "the rule stated
in Allred" related to contract zoning.
185. Hall v. City of Durham, 88 N.C. App. 53, 61, 362 S.E.2d 791, 795, (1987), aff'd on other
grounds, 323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
186. This was the doctrine and message to be learned from Allred. See supra notes 47-57 and
accompanying text.
187. See supra cases cited in notes 48-51. This interpretation traces back to a 1985 decision in
which the court of appeals held that "[i]f the rezoning is done in consideration of an assurance that a

particular tract or parcel will be developed in accordance with a restricted plan this is contract
zoning and is illegal." Willis v. Union County, 77 N.C. App. 407, 409, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1985)
(emphasis added), quoted in Alderman v. Chatham County, 89 N.C. App. 610, 618, 366 S.E.2d 885,
890, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 103 (1988). As authority for this proposition, the court
cited the Allred case but, significantly, did not quote from AlIred or even cite to a particular page of
the Alired decision. See id.
188. See cases cited supra notes 48-51.
189. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 12-13. "Breathes there a city councilman (or
planning board member), with soul so dead, who never to himself hath said, 'I wonder what he plans
to do with his property,' when confronted with an application for rezoning an area?" Id. at 1. These
writers recount a humorous story that arose when a council was aware of the restrictions placed on it
by the holdings of these cases:
At one zoning commission meeting, the gentleman speaking in favor of a rezoning, when
advised by the Chairman that the Commission could not "hear" the testimony he was
giving (about a specific use), moved closer to the microphone and continued in a louder
voice (not recognizing the distinction between legal constraints and deafness).
Id. at 13. Such was the state of contract zoning and its effects on zoning decisions in North Carolina
before the recent cases. For example, the Winston-Salem zoning ordinance still provides that:
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"contract zoning" problem by developing a good record showing that all of the
uses had been considered and approved. Some zoning authorities, however, apparently found it easier to avoid hearing the plans instead of hearing them and

developing an adequate record.' 9 0
In Chrismon and Hall the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the definition of contract zoning and decreased the likelihood that courts will invalidate
zoning amendments on the grounds of contract zoning. The Chrismon court
stated that contract zoning occurs when a zoning authority and a landowner
"undertake reciprocal obligations in the context of a bilateralcontract." 1 9 1 The
court quoted one author's example of such reciprocal obligations: the land-

owner agrees to "'subject his property to deed restrictions'" and the zoning
authority "'binds itself to enact the amendment and not to alter the zoning
change for a specified period of time.' "192 The Hall court repeated this definition and example,' 93 and further explained that "[i]n short, a 'meeting of the

minds' must occur; mutual assurances must be exchanged."' 194 One writer asserts that with this definition, North Carolina returns to the mainstream in
95
terms of the contract zoning doctrine.'
While the court has narrowed the North Carolina definition of contract
zoning, the court has not overruled Allred and Blades. Justices Webb and
Mitchell disagreed with the narrowing of the contract zoning doctrine to instances involving bilateral agreements 19 6 because, they argued, the majority effectively overruled the holdings of both of those prior cases. 197 Allred and
If [an applicant for rezoning] elects to petition for general use district zoning, he may not
refer either in his petition, or at any hearings related to the petition, to the use intended for
the property upon rezoning. The board of aldermen may not consider the intended use in
determining whether to approve or disapprove the petition, but shall consider all of the
uses permitted within the requested general use district.
CODE OF WINsTON-SALEM, N.C. § 25-6 (Sept. 6, 1989).
190. See S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 12-13; see also supra note 189 (authors
recount story of city council that could not "hear" testimony).
191. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593 (citing Shapiro, supra note 4, at 267 and D.
MANDELKER, supra note 43, at § 6.59). Mandelker writes that "[t]he term 'contract zoning' should
probably be applied only to a true bilateral contract between the landowner and the municipality."
D. MANDELKER, supra note 43, at § 6.59; see also Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 568
(quoting the definition previously set forth in Chrismon). Some writers contend that both unilateral
and bilateral agreements should be invalid. See Wegner, supra note 43, at 979 n.122 (asserting that
"distinction between bilateral and unilateral agreements seems problematic on policy grounds...
because even unilateral agreements can serve as an incentive to government action"). On the other
hand, if the evil to be avoided through application of contract zoning is the sale or bargaining away
of zoning decisions, then perhaps the only instance in which a zoning authority bargains away its
discretion is when it enters a bilateral agreement and makes an enforceable promise.
192. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Shapiro, supra note 4, at 269).
193. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 635, 370
S.E.2d at 593).
194. Id. at 298, 372 S.E.2d at 568.
195. Green, supra note 70, at 5.
196. For descriptions of their dissenting opinions in Chrismon and concurring opinion in Hall,
see supra notes 123-25 & 151 and accompanying text.
197. Hall, 323 N.C. at 306, 372 S.E.2d at 572 (Webb, J., concurring opinion with which Justice
Mitchell joins); Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 641-42, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting opinion with
which Justice Mitchell joins). Justices Webb and Mitchell do not cite any specific page or quote any
specific language from Allred or Blades to support their contention that those cases have been overruled or abandoned. See supra note 125.
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Blades, however, should not be cited as contract zoning cases, because in neither
of those cases did the court describe contract zoning, nor did there exist a bilateral agreement between the zoning authorities and the rezoning applicants. 9 8
Despite the concern of Justices Webb and Mitchell that those prior cases have
been overruled, Allred and Blades still stand for the proposition that a zoning
authority may not rezone property to a general use district without considering
all of the uses permissible under the new zoning classification, even though an
applicant plans to make only limited use of the property.1 99 Thus, Allred and
Blades should properly be cited as cases that prohibit insufficiently analyzed
200
rezoning.
The procedurally insufficient zoning practice invalidated in Allred and
Blades is still prohibited, as is evident in the result reached in Hall.20 1 Justices
Webb and Mitchell in their concurrence in Hall should have recognized that the
prior holdings in Allred and Blades still had some validity because of the court's
holding that the rezoning was invalid due to the Council's failure to consider all
of the permissible uses under the new zoning classification. 20 2 The recent decisions only alter the definition of contract zoning in North Carolina and distinguish between the practices of contract zoning and insufficiently analyzed
rezoning. A zoning authority may not enter into a binding agreement in which
it promises to rezone-this is contract zoning. Although this definition of contract zoning may limit the line of cases following Allred and Blades,20 3 the essential holdings of Allred and Blades are still alive today: zoning authorities must
consider all of the uses available to a landowner in the proposed zoning classification before approving the rezoning of the landowner's property.
Courts now must distinguish between situations in which a bilateral agreement obviously has been reached between a zoning authority and a property
owner and situations in which a zoning authority has rezoned to a new district
without considering all of the uses that will be permissible for the property
under that new classification. The former situation should result in a finding of
contract zoning, while the latter constitutes insufficiently analyzed rezoning.
Zoning authorities should be able to avoid the latter problem if their city or
county attorneys properly warn them that they must consider all uses that will
be permitted as of right under the new zoning classification.
There is another practical result of this adjustment in the North Carolina
definition of contract zoning: zoning authorities, previously concerned that they
could not hear a developer's plan for the property if it were rezoned because this
might result in a finding of contract zoning, now may hear those plans without
fear. Zoning authorities may now consider the applicant's envisioned uses without fear of a finding of contract zoning unless they also have reached some sort
198. See supra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
199. Hall, 323 N.C. at 301-03, 372 S.E.2d at 569-70.
200. For a definition of insufficiently analyzed rezoning, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
201. Hall, 323 N.C. at 304-05, 372 S.E.2d at 571-72 (the zoning amendment was invalidated).
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 47-51 & 185-88 and accompanying text.
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of bilateral agreement with the applicant. 2° 4 Because zoning authorities must
still avoid insufficiently analyzed rezoning, however, they must consider and find
the property appropriate for all of the uses that will be permissible if it is
20 5

rezoned.

This redefinition of contract zoning allows the city council or the board of
commissioners to consider what is planned for the area. The former approach
was unwise because it prohibited a decisionmaker from examining all of the evidence available before reaching a decision. On the other hand, people tend to
use a risk analysis when making a decision. For example, when a zoning authority is faced with deciding whether to rezone a parcel of property so that a proposed project may be constructed thereon, the natural tendency is to balance the
proposed project and its benefits against the detriments that will arise from that
use of the property. Similarly, the zoning authority will only consider the detriments that would result if the land in question is not used for the proposed
development if it foresees a tangible risk that the applicant will develop the property in an undesirable manner. City attorneys, therefore, should warn city
councilpersons to avoid this natural tendency for weighing the risks.
Even though the narrowing of the definition of contract zoning allows zoning authorities to hear plans proposed by developers seeking rezoning, the insufficiently analyzed rezoning doctrine still protects neighbors from hasty zoning

decisions made by councils or boards who are blinded by the attractiveness of
developer promises for a particular site. Attorneys who advise zoning authorities must remind them before they pass zoning amendments that there is no
guarantee that the applicant always will use the property as shown in the proposed plans, so it is essential that the council or board find that the property is
appropriate for all of the permitted uses. Should it appear to a court that the
zoning authority has not fully considered all of the uses that will be available in
the new classification, the court should overrule the rezoning as insufficiently
20 6
analyzed rezoning.
C. JudicialApproval of Conditional Use Zoning
As a result of the Chrismon decision, conditional use zoning now has been
20 7
approved in North Carolina by both the supreme court and the legislature.
Thus, property now may be rezoned to a conditional use district in which no use
is permitted without obtaining a valid conditional use permit. 20 8 The court asserted that it was joining a growing number of jurisdictions that approve of this
204. Hall, 323 N.C. at 298-99, 372 S.E.2d at 568; Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 635, 370 S.E.2d at 593.
205. Hall, 323 N.C. at 304-05, 372 S.E.2d at 571-72; Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530,
545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440-41 (1971).
206. Hall, 323 N.C. at 303-05, 372 S.E.2d at 571-72; Allred, 277 N.C. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 44041. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text for the definition of insufficiently analyzed
rezoning.
207. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 618-22, 370 S.E.2d at 584-86; Act of July 4, 1985, ch. 607, 1985
N.C. Sess. Laws 776 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342, 160A-382 (1987)).
208. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

type of zoning. 20 9 In fact, the conditional use district concept is unique to
North Carolina. While a growing number of jurisdictions have approved some
form of conditional zoning, 2 1" no other jurisdiction has adopted the concept of

rezoning to conditional use districts. Many of the states that have upheld conditional zoning have done so only where the rezoning would have been permissible

without the conditions. 2 11 In the language of one court, the conditions are imposed "to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change."'2 12 However, in conditional use zoning as approved in Chrismon, the zoning authority may rezone

property to a conditional use district when rezoning to the corresponding general use district presumably would be impermissible. 21 3 The court even held
that the property need not be suitable for all of the uses that would be permitted
in the corresponding general use district. 21 4 Because the premise underlying the

decisions of most state courts approving conditional zoning-that the rezoning
would have been appropriate even without the conditions-is not a prerequisite

for conditional use zoning as approved in North Carolina, the supreme court
cannot accurately state that it is joining a growing number of jurisdictions that
approve of conditional2 use
zoning. In fact, North Carolina has instituted a
15
novel zoning approach.
Both the court of appeals and the dissenting justices in Chrismon essentially
argued that conditional use zoning constituted contract zoning. 216 The majority, however, held that conditional use zoning generally is permissible unless a
209. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 620-21, 370 S.E.2d at 585.
210. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. In those states, the courts reasoned that a
neighbor should not be allowed to challenge successfully a rezoning amendment when the rezoning
would have been proper without conditions, but the zoning authority instead imposed conditions on
the applicant's rezoning request in order to make the rezoning less harmful to the neighbor. See,
e.g., Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ga. 709, 713, 235 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1977) (for the court's analysis, see
supra note 65); Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 600-01, 421 N.E.2d

818, 821, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (1981) (same).
212. Cross, 238 Ga. at 713, 235 S.E.2d at 382.
213. If the property is suitable for rezoning to a general use district, the owner would presumably seek rezoning to the general use district instead of the conditional use district. This choice would
avoid the requirement of seeking a conditional use permit. Furthermore, the Chrismon court would
certainly not have approved a rezoning to a general use district that allowed Mr. Clapp to use his
farmland for manufacturing uses permitted as of right in the M-2 district in Guilford County. Indeed, the court noted that the rezoning to a CU-M-2 district was permissible because it allowed the
sale of agricultural chemicals, "which is not drastically at odds with other uses in the predecessor
zone." Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 624, 370 S.E.2d at 587. The court recognized that some of the uses
allowed under the general use M-2 district "are more clearly inconsistent with ongoing uses under
the predecessor zone." Id. Some fairly heavy industrial uses were permitted as of right in the general use M-2 district. See supra note 90 (describing some of the 86 uses).
214. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587 (using the word "available" when the court
probably intended to use the word "suitable"; see supra note 119 and accompanying text for discussion of why the court probably intended to use "suitable"). When holding that all uses need not be
permissible, the court cited only two other cases. See id. (citing Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb.
862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963) and State ex tel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W,2d 533
(1970)). But see Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 278 (the court appears to have been
considering a case in which the zoning would have been permissible without the conditions).
215. The conditional use zoning approach is also unique in its use of conditional use districts.
216. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 640, 370 S.E.2d at 596 (Mitchell, J., dissenting); id. at 641, 370
S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting); Chrismon, 85 N.C. App. 211, 219, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1987),
rev'd, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
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given situation is invalidated on grounds that it constitutes contract zoning or is
otherwise illegal. 2 17 By narrowly redefining contract zoning as a bilateral agree-

ment, 2t8 the court allowed conditional use zoning to occur as conceived by its
designers: that is, a landowner may apply to have her property rezoned to a
conditional use district and present an application for a conditional use permit at
2 19
the same time.
There are several possible explanations for the North Carolina Supreme
Court's willingness to approve conditional use zoning. Perhaps the court
wanted to allow zoning authorities to hear development proposals for property
being considered for rezoning. Some thought this practice had been prohibited
in North Carolina, causing Davenport and Green to propose the conditional use
district concept. 220 The court, however, eliminated the purported obstacle
preventing zoning authorities from hearing development proposals during re22 1
zoning considerations when it narrowed the definition of contract zoning.
Alternatively, the court may have approved conditional use zoning in order
to influence the scope of judicial review available to developers and neighbors
when they appeal zoning decisions to the courts. One of the significant aspects
of conditional use permits is that when a landowner shows by competent evidence that he has met the conditions listed in the ordinance, then "'primafacie
he is entitled to it."'222 If a request for a conditional use permit is denied, a
landowner has this doctrine in her favor if she can show the court that she met
the prima facie requirements. The zoning authority then has the burden of
proof to show that it had substantial evidence supporting the decision to deny
the permit request. Suppose, on the other hand, that the property is rezoned and
a conditional use permit is granted. The neighbors of this property may seek
judicial review in the courts, and they again will have greater protection in the
courts because the decision was a quasi-judicial one. 223 Thus, the approval of
conditional use zoning may have been the court's way of bringing more decisions of zoning authorities under closer judicial scrutiny.
All of the excitement about the flexibility provided by conditional use zoning presumes, however, that zoning authorities will create conditional use dis-

tricts224 and that landowners will apply to have their property zoned in a
217. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 622-23, 370 S.E.2d at 58. In addition to illegal spot zoning and
illegal contract zoning, a conditional use zoning amendment may be invalidated if it is unreasonable,
arbitrary, discriminatory, or not in the public interest. See id.
218. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
219. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 614-15, 370 S.E.2d at 581-82; S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN,
supra note 3, at 8.
220. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 6-8; see supra notes 187-90 and accompanying
text.

221. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
222. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 468, 202 S.E.2d 129, 136
(1974). See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (court's language quoted more extensively).
223. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 626-27, 265 S.E.2d
379, 383 (1980); see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
224. Several cities and counties have had specific authority to create conditional use districts
since 1973. See supra note 70. In 1985, the legislature specifically granted all North Carolina cities
and counties authority to create conditional use districts. Act of July 4, 1985, ch. 607, 1985 N.C.
Sess. Laws 776 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-342, 160A-382 (1987)). Despite having this
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conditional use district with the burden of seeking a new conditional use permit
every time they want to change the use of their land. 225 If either of these assumptions proves to be false, there will not be any greater number of conditional
use permit decisions leading to closer judicial scrutiny.
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A.

What (If Any) Uses Must be Considered in a Decision to Rezone to a
Conditional Use District?
There was a significant disagreement between the court of appeals and the

supreme court in Chrismon regarding which uses must be considered before
property can be rezoned to a conditional use district. 226 The supreme court
concluded that "it is not necessary that property rezoned to a conditional use

district be [suitable] for all of the uses allowed under the corresponding general
use district. ' 227 The court, however, said nothing about what uses a zoning
authority must consider and find appropriate before rezoning property to a conditional use district. 22 8 Instead, the court implied that uses only need be considered and approved when the board considers the conditional use permit.229 This
is apparently the argument that the zoning authority presented to the court of
appeals. 230 It is therefore arguable that the supreme court did not anticipate
authority to create conditional use districts, North Carolina zoning authorities have not rushed to
create such districts. Charlotte, for example, has had authority to create conditional use districts
since 1973, see Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1283, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d sess., 461; however, the
Charlotte zoning ordinance does not provide for any conditional use districts, although it does provide for conditional uses in many of its general use districts. See CODE OF CHARLOTrE, N.C.
§§ 3000-3402 (Apr. 10, 1989) (providing only for general use districts); see also CODE OF DURHAM,
N.C. § 24-3 (May 15, 1989) (provision establishing districts only provides for general use districts).
But see GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 30-202-203 (May 11, 1989) (listing conditional use districts); Guilford County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance § 6-17 (1988) (same); CODE Or WINsTON-SALEM, N.C. § 25-6 (Sept. 6, 1989) (providing for "special districts" that allow no uses aside
from those listed in a "special use district permit"). In a move that could mark a trend of the future,
the Raleigh City Council recently amended its zoning ordinance to allow conditional use districts.
Compare CODE OF RALEIGH, N.C. § 10-2011 (Sept. 6, 1988) with id. § 10-2011 (Apr. 18, 1989)
(provision listing established districts now includes conditional use districts).
225. Davenport and Green conducted a statistical analysis of rezoning requests in Greensboro
after conditional use districts were implemented there. They found that over a five and one-half year
period and out of 448 rezoning requests, 110 (22%) of the requests were for conditional use districts
and conditional use permits. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 17.
226. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 623-25, 370 S.E.2d at 586-87 (property need not be found suitable
for all uses permitted as of right in the corresponding general use district before it can be rezoned to
a conditional use district, see supra note 119 and accompanying text); Chrismon, 85 N.C. App. 211,
218, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1987) ("in order to properly rezone the area to a conditional use district,
the zoning authority initially must determine that the property, under the new [conditional use]
zoning classification, is suitable for all the uses permitted in its corresponding [general use] district"),
rey'd, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). The court of appeals' view is unusual because if every
use permissible in the corresponding general use district was appropriate for the property in question, no property owner would request having his property placed in a conditional use district when
he or she could have it zoned in a general use district and have uses permitted as of right.
227. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587. Although the court used the word "available" instead of "suitable," it is clear from the context of the discussion that the court intended
"suitable." See discussion supra note 119.

228. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587.

229. See id. at 624, 638, 370 S.E.2d at 587, 595.
230. See Chrismon, 85 N.C. App. 216, 218, 354 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1987) ("Defendants, relying on
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that any rezoning to a conditional use district could be overruled because it
231
constituted insufficiently analyzed rezoning as that term is described above.
If this is true, then a zoning authority could give virtually automatic approval to
any request for rezoning to a conditional use district and be faced only with the
threat of illegal spot zoning.2 32 It is only the conditional use permit decision
that would then be subject to close judicial scrutiny because it is a quasi-judicial
2 33
decision.

Considering the rezoning decision as legislative and the permit decision as
quasi-judicial is a rational way to treat conditional use zoning. The court's deci-

sion regarding what uses must be considered, however, presents a difficult problem. An applicant for a conditional use permit is prima facie entitled to the

permit if she meets the conditions listed in the zoning ordinance for getting a
conditional use permit for that

use. 2 3 4

In one case, for example, the court of

appeals ruled that a landowner was entitled to a conditional use permit allowing
him to use his property as an adult bookstore because he had met the conditions
listed and because the zoning authority no longer had the discretion to deny the
permit. 235 Because the zoning authority (presumably) had considered the prop-

erty to be appropriate for this conditional use when the original zoning decision

was made, it was too late to deny the conditional use permit on grounds that the
site was incompatible with this conditional use. 236 In the Chrismon situation,
for example, it should be noted that Mr. Clapp may now return to the Guilford

County Board of Commissioners and apply for a new conditional use permit for
any one of the other eighty-five conditional uses that are listed in the conditional
the 'conditional use' nature of the industrial classification, would apparently argue that a CU-M-2
zone.., can be restricted to whatever uses are reasonable and appropriate for the surrounding area.
Therefore, they argue [that] a reasonable basis exists if the approved use itself satisfies the purposes
of the enabling legislation."), rev'd, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
231. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
232. A zoning authority easily can avoid contract zoning claims by refraining from entering
bilateral agreements. A zoning authority also can avoid claims that a zoning amendment is not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan by making sure it keeps such a plan up to date. Thus, aside
from spot zoning, there would be little else on which to challenge a rezoning to a conditional use
district.
233. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
235. Harts Book Stores, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 53 N.C. App. 753, 758-59, 281 S.E.2d 761, 764
(1981). The city zoning ordinance listed adult book stores as a use permissible with a special use
permit. Id. at 756-57, 281 S.E.2d at 762-63. Plaintiff applied for the special use permit and
presented evidence showing that the conditions had been met, but the board of adjustment denied
the permit on grounds that the bookstore would be "incompatible" with the surrounding area. Id. at
758, 281 S.E.2d at 764. The court ruled that this denial was impermissible because the board could
not make legislative decisions; instead, it could only refuse to grant the permit on grounds listed in
the ordinance. Id. at 758-59, 281 S.E.2d at 764.
236. Id. at 758, 281 S.E.2d at 764. In making a conditional use permit decision, the zoning
authority " 'may grant or deny a... permit solely on the basis of the specific authority delegated by
the regulations, and subject to the limitations imposed thereby.'" Woodhouse v. Board of Comm'rs,
299 N.C. 211, 218, 261 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1980) (quoting R. ANDERSON, 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING § 19.19, at 425 (2d ed. 1977)). The board must base its decision solely on the factors listed
in the ordinance. Id. at 218-19, 261 S.E.2d at 887. When the use was listed in the ordinance as a
conditional use permissible in that district upon the issuance of a conditional use permit (which is to
be granted if certain conditions are met), this "is [the] equivalent [of] a legislative finding that the
prescribed use is one which is in harmony with the other uses permitted in the district." Id. at 216,
261 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting A. RATHKOPF, 3 LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 54-5 (1979)).
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use district to which his property was rezoned. 2 37 The Board will not be able to
argue that his property is not appropriate for that use; the Board may only deny
the conditional use permit based on the conditions listed in the ordinance and on
238
substantial evidence.
The real problem with this practical difficulty in Chrismon is that the court
held that the zoning authority did not have to consider these conditional uses as
compatible with the property before rezoning Mr. Clapp's property to a conditional use district. Because an applicant for a conditional use permit is prima
facie entitled to the permit when she establishes that the property meets the
conditions specified in the ordinance for a conditional use permit, the zoning
authority should be required, when considering a request to rezone property to a
conditional use district, to determine that the property is appropriate for all of
the conditional uses listed for that district if the conditions specified in the zoning ordinance are met. Hence, when a property owner applies for and is granted
rezoning to a conditional use district listing conditional uses A, B, C, and D and
simultaneously receives a conditional use permit allowing use A, but then later
returns to apply for conditional use B, C, or D, the zoning authority already
should have found that the property is appropriate for those uses if the conditions enumerated in the ordinance have been met. 239 Zoning authorities should
give this same consideration to conditional uses listed in a general use district
when they rezone property to that general use district.
In rezoning to a conditional use district, the zoning authority should be
careful to note which uses are listed as conditional uses and to find that the
property would be appropriate for each of those uses if the conditions listed in
the ordinance are met. For this reason, courts should apply the Allred principles
prohibiting insufficiently analyzed rezoning 240 and require zoning authorities to
consider all of the conditional uses that may be available for the property if it is
rezoned to a conditional use district. Although the Chrismon court may have
been anxious to approve conditional use zoning, it may have approved a potential disaster. Because of the case law on conditional use permits, if Mr. Clapp or
his successor in ownership should ever want to try a manufacturing use for this
property, he would only have to meet the requirements for a conditional use
permit and would not have to overcome the barrier of rezoning to a different
district. Therefore, in a rezoning to a conditional use district, there should be
situations in which the rezoning should be overturned on a claim of insufficiently
analyzed rezoning. Neighbors should not be denied a cause of action at the
237. See supra note 90. Mr. Clapp's property is now zoned to a CU-M-2 District, which allows
such conditional uses as the manufacture of chemicals, machinery, textiles, and tobacco, among
other manufacturing conditional uses.
238. See supra note 29.
239. For example, if a conditional use district lists apartments, convenience stores, and service
stations as conditional uses upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, and if a property owner requests that her property be rezoned to that conditional use district in order to build apartments, the
zoning authority should be required to consider not only the appropriateness of this property for
apartments but also for the other conditional uses that are allowed for that district (and thus determine that this property would be appropriate for a convenience store or service station if the conditions are met and the owner applies for a conditional use permit).
240. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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outset when a zoning authority rezones property to a conditional use district
without consideration of all conditional uses that potentially will be available for
that property. The property owner whose property is rezoned might otherwise
be entitled to a conditional use permit for a conditional use that never was considered in relation to that parcel of land.
To reconcile the problem of uses that are not considered when a zoning
authority rezones property to a conditional use district, the supreme court ap-

pears to have two choices. First, the court may amend its Chrismon decision
and determine what sort of consideration a zoning authority must give to conditional uses before rezoning to a conditional use district. 24 1 This approach would
add the possibility of insufficiently analyzed rezoning to cases involving conditional use zoning. On the other hand, the court instead could choose to establish
different rules for granting conditional use permits for property that is zoned in
a conditional use district. In other words, although a conditional use permit
decision is a quasi-judicial decision in a general use district, the court could
choose to give zoning authorities more legislative discretion when making a conditional use permit decision in a conditional use district. Two zoning authorities
242
have chosen this route regardless of whether they had the authority to do so.
To be consistent, the court should adopt the first option and set forth the sort of
consideration a zoning authority should give to conditional uses in order to
avoid an insufficiently analyzed rezoning challenge. The court should insist that
zoning authorities determine that the property being considered for rezoning
would be appropriate for all of the conditional uses listed for that district if the
property meets the conditions listed in the ordinance for each conditional use.
B.

Will Conditional Use Zoning Be Practical?

As is evident from the previous section, it is unclear from Chrismon
whether the zoning authority must consider and approve the property for the
applicable list of conditional uses before rezoning it to a conditional use district.
Other practicalities will also influence whether conditional use zoning is successful. For example, for conditional use zoning to be declared a success in terms of
increasing flexibility, it first must be used. Despite the fact that some jurisdic241. This same sort of consideration then should be required for conditional uses that are listed
in addition to uses permitted as of right when a zoning authority rezones property to a general use
district that has a list of conditional uses.
242. The Greensboro and Guilford County zoning ordinances have an unusual provision: "Requests for Conditional Use Permits as authorized by this Ordinance in Conditional Use Districts
shall be processed and considered in the same procedure as set forth in this Ordinance for rezoning
requests." Guilford County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance § 6-17(B) (1988), quoted in Record at 50,
Chrismon (No. 232PA87); see also GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-183(a) (May
11, 1989) (virtually identical provision). It would thus seem that Greensboro and Guilford County

are attempting to circumvent the North Carolina case law holding that a conditional use permit
decision is a quasi-judicial decision and subject to closer judicial scrutiny. Perhaps in future cases
the court should consider whether a different standard should govern inconditional use district cases
in terms of whether an applicant is ever prima facie entitled to a conditional use permit and whether
the decision is still a quasi-judicial one. Until the court considers this question, Greensboro and
Guilford County seem to be suspect in their attempts to apply different standards and procedures for
conditional use permit decisions in conditional use district property than are applied in general use
districts.
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tions sought special legislative approval in order to create conditional use districts, 243 very few North Carolina cities and counties appear to have created
2 44
conditional use districts yet, the first step in conditional use zoning.
When jurisdictions do create conditional use districts, success will depend
on how well they design and draft the districts. The creators of the conditional
use zoning concept suggest that zoning authorities simply "duplicate exactly the
existing set of districts" so that there is a conditional use district for each corresponding general use district. 245 Despite the "simplicity" of this procedure,
conditional use zoning could be far more useful if the zoning authorities think
about what conditional uses would be most compatible in a given district. A
zoning authority contemplating doubling the number of zoning districts should

create some intermediate general use districts with uses permitted as of right and
carefully design some conditional use districts.
Although the conditional use zoning concept may turn out to be very helpful as a flexibilty device in zoning, this author questions whether the whole concept places too many restrictions on a property owner's use of his land.
Although Mr. Clapp may be thankful that he now has a conditional use permit
allowing him to sell agricultural chemicals on his property, 246 he may not be
happy ten years from now when he wants to expand his business to another use
or sell his property to someone with different plans. Because his property is in a
conditional use district, a prospective buyer may wish to discount the sales price
for Mr. Clapp's property to account for the inconvenience and uncertainty in
obtaining a different conditional use permit or obtaining rezoning to a different
district. Furthermore, a property owner whose land is in a conditional use district has no freedom to change the use of his land without returning to the zoning authority for approval. Wise landowners may not want to be this restricted
in the use of their property. In a general use district, a property owner usually
can change her use to, at least, a similar use without gaining the approval of the
zoning authority.
If the court chooses to allow rezoning to conditional use districts without
consideration of all of the conditional uses and to allow more legislative discretion to the zoning authority when making conditional use permit decisions in
conditional use districts, the North Carolina legislature should amend the statutes which stipulate that conditional use permit decisions cannot be subjected to
supermajority voting requirements by a valid protest petition. 247 In a condi243. See supra note 70.
244. See supra note 224.
245. S. DAVENPORT & P. GREEN, supra note 3, at 7. This is precisely what the City of Greensboro and Guilford County have done in setting up their conditional use districts. See GREENSBORO,
N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 30-202-203 (May 11, 1989); Guilford County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance § 6-17 (1988).
246. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.

247. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-340 & 160A-381 (1987). The statutes provide that "no vote

greater than a majority vote shall be required for the city council to issue such [conditional use]
permits." Id. § 160A-381. A supermajority (three-fourths) vote is required to approve a zoning
amendment that changes the zoning classification of property only if more than 20 percent of the
neighbors sign a protest petition against the rezoning. See id. § 160A-385(a).
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tional use district, if all of the conditional uses are not considered and approved
during the decision to rezone to a conditional use district, then the really significant decision is the conditional use permit decision. When a zoning authority
considers a conditional use permit decision, neighbors should be able to present
a protest petition with the required number of votes and trigger the requirement
of a supermajority vote necessary for approval of a conditional use permit.
C. Should ConditionalZoning Be Approved in North Carolina?
Because the supreme court has alleged that it is joining other jurisdictions
and because it has cited many cases involving conditional zoning-as opposed to
conditional use zoning-the question remains whether, given an appropriate
case, the North Carolina Supreme Court would approve conditional zoning in a

general use district situation. That question almost arose, and perhaps could

248
have been decided, in Hall.
In its brief to the court, the Durham City Council contended that this rezoning was "merely an instance of orthodox conditional zoning. '249 The court
argued that "[a]lthough defendants make a spirited attempt to use Chrismon to
support their contention that the situation here is a type of conditional use zoning, their reliance on that decision is misplaced. '250 The court accurately found
that the Durham City Council may not rely on Chrismon because the Chrismon
case involved rezoning to a conditional use district, and the council in this case
had rezoned to a general use district.251 However, the court's reference to the
council's "spirited attempt" and "misplaced" reliance is ironic in light of the
fact that the court itself in Chrismon made a spirited attempt to support its
approval of conditional use zoning with citations and references to other jurisdictions. 252 As distinguished above, the jurisdictions cited by the court in Chrismon that constituted the "growing trend of jurisdictions" approving conditional
use zoning 253 may in fact only be cited as approving conditional zoning.2 54 The
practices approved in other states in the cases cited by the court in Chrismon
more closely resemble the practice that the court struck down in Hall, so the
court's rebuke of the city council is more than a little ironic.
The Chrismon court cited with approval one case that bears a remarkable
resemblance to the Hall case. In Bucholz v. City of Omaha255 a corporation
obtained an option to purchase a 103-acre tract of land in a largely residential
area for the purpose of building a large shopping center. 256 The landowner and
the corporation applied to the city council to have the property rezoned from a

248. See Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
249. Id. at 299, 372 S.E.2d at 568.
250. Id. at 301, 372 S.E.2d at 568.
251. Id. at 301, 372 S.E.2d at 569.
252. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 620-22, 370 S.E.2d at 584-86.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
255. 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963), cited with approval in Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 620 n.3
& 625, 370 S.E.2d at 585 n.3 & 587.
256. Id. at 864, 120 N.W.2d at 273.
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low-density residential district to a district that would permit the shopping

center. 257 The applicants presented their plans for a shopping center to the

council. 2 58 The fact pattern thus far is virtually identical to the situation in
Hall.259 The cases are similar in terms of the restrictions 260 that would be
placed on the land. In Bucholz the protective covenant agreement was between

26 t
the landowner and the option-holder wishing to build a shopping center;
whereas, in Hall the proposed restrictive covenant was to be placed in the deed

transferring title from the landowner to Lowe's. The Nebraska Supreme Court

upheld the conditional zoning after citing cases that had both disapproved and
approved conditional zoning. 262 Having cited the Bucholz case only two months

earlier in approving conditional use zoning, 263 and having left unanswered the
question whether conditional zoning would be approved in North Carolina for
rezoning to general use districts in the form approved elsewhere, Hall would
have been an appropriate case in which to have considered the question and
distinguished conditional zoning from conditional use zoning. The council's decision did involve rezoning to a general use district, so the court correctly distin264
guished this case from conditional use zoning and the Chrismon decision.
However, the Durham City Council followed the same practice as zoning authorities in Nebraska, New York, and Georgia where conditional zoning has
265

been approved.
The procedures followed by the City of Durham can be distinguished from
those in other states on one ground that seems insignificant in light of the restric-

tions to be placed on the property. The courts that have approved conditional
zoning have done so on the premise that the land would have been appropriately
rezoned to its new classification without any conditions and that the conditions
were imposed only to ameliorate the change to the new district. 266 Even the

Bucholz court included language to the effect that the neighbors should not be
257. Id.
258. Id. at 871, 120 N.W.2d at 276.
259. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
260. In Hall Lowe's suggested all of the restrictions voluntarily. Hall, 323 N.C. at 295-96, 372
S.E.2d at 566. A council member stated at the meeting that
[t]he key here is something that I have never heard of before-these people [the landowner
and Lowe's] are adding a "covenant" to the deed that says that if Lowe's does anything
else other than what they are saying they are going to do with this land tonight, that land
must go to the Eno River Association.
Id. at 303, 372 S.E.2d at 571. In Bucholz the city council proposed the restrictions and drafted the
restrictive covenants. Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 871, 120 N.W.2d at 276.
261. Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 872, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
262. Id. at 874-75, 120 N.W.2d at 278. The court also addressed whether the city had entered a
contract to rezone (which would be impermissible as contract zoning); see supra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text. The court concluded that there had been no "bargain or agreement between the
applicants and the city." Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 873, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
263. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 625, 370 S.E.2d at 587.
264. See Hall, 323 N.C. at 301, 372 S.E.2d at 569. For discussion of the distinctions between
conditional zoning in general use districts and conditional use zoning in conditional use districls, see
supra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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able to complain that conditions were imposed on their

behalf.2

67

In Hall the court ultimately based its decision to invalidate the rezoning on
the fact that the council had not sufficiently considered all of the uses available
to Lowe's under the new classification. 268 Thus, the court suggested that some
of the uses permissible under the new classification might not be appropriate for
the property, and the council should whole heartedly consider all of those uses
because of the possibility that the land would someday be used for one of those
uses despite the plans of the applicant now before the council.
Although insufficiently analyzed rezoning has been an impermissible practice in North Carolina for many years, 269 it may not have been a valid concern
in Hall because of the reverter restriction that Lowe's proposed to place in its
deed. A council should not have to consider uses that would be permissible in a
general use district in which property is proposed to be rezoned when those uses
are expressly prohibited in a restrictive covenant in the deed for that property.
Such a requirement appears useless. When property is restricted by enforceable
covenants in a deed, the uses prohibited by the deed should not have to be considered and determined to be appropriate for that property in order for it to be
rezoned to a general use district that otherwise would allow those uses but for
the restrictive covenant.
In spite of this argument for approving conditional zoning in a case like
Hall, the court's decision in Hall can be defended as a practical matter on the
grounds that the restrictions had not yet been attached to the property, but
would only be placed in the deed from B,K,B, Inc. to Lowe's, which appears to
have been conditioned upon the successful rezoning of the property. 270 Thus,
there was the possibility that after the property was rezoned the property might
not be transferred from B,K,B, Inc. to Lowe's after all or that the deed might
not include the reverter clause. In those situations, the owner would have available all of the uses allowed in a C-4(D) district and there would be no reverter
27 1
clause to protect the city and the neighboring landowners.
The parties in the Bucholz case overcame this prohibition against rezoning
in anticipation of restrictive covenants that might never become effective by exe272
cuting their agreement before the rezoning was approved by the council.
Their "agreement expressly [provides] that it [was] not conditioned upon a rezoning of the [property]." 273 It is unlikely, however, that many prospective buyers would agree to place restrictions in the deed before they have some guarantee
that the property will be rezoned to allow the use for which they have planned
the property. In considering solutions to this problem, developers should be
267. Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 278.
268. Hall, 323 N.C. at 303-04, 372 S.E.2d at 570-71.
269. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
270. B,K,B, Inc. was described as the owner of the land, and the proposed plans included description of a reverter clause "to be placed in the deed from B,K,B, Inc. to Lowe's." Hall, 322 N.C.
at 296, 372 S.E.2d at 566.

271. Id. at 303, 372 S.E.2d at 571.
272. Bucholz, 174 Neb. at 872, 120 N.W.2d at 276.
273. Id.
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wary of the prohibition against contract zoning 274 -- they may not enter into a
bilateral agreement with the zoning authority.
V.

CONCLUSION

These new developments in zoning law in North Carolina give cities and
counties greater zoning flexibility by allowing conditional use zoning and by allowing planners to consider the development proposals of those who request
rezoning. The North Carolina Supreme Court wisely distinguished between
contract zoning and insufficiently analyzed rezoning and has narrowed the scope
of illegal contract zoning. Furthermore, the court sanctioned conditional use
zoning-albeit while under the mistaken belief that it was joining other jurisdictions-providing a potential solution to zoning inflexibility. The court has, however, left the success of this new type of zoning to individual cities and counties,
who must respond with conditional use districts that are well considered and

well written in their zoning ordinances.
To better define this innovative approach, the court, at its earliest opportunity, should require a zoning authority to consider all of the conditional uses
permitted in a proposed conditional use district upon the finding of conditions
sufficient to justify the granting of a conditional use permit. In the area of zoning formerly thought to constitute contract zoning in this state, the court should
adopt a term for situations in which a zoning authority rezones to a general use
district without considering all of the uses that will be available in the new district-this Comment suggests one possible term: "insufficiently analyzed rezoning." Finally, in the area of conditional zoning, as distinguished from
conditional use zoning, the court should approve the form of conditional zoning
that it relied on so heavily in approving conditional use zoning. However, the
court should continue to insist that any restrictions to be placed in a deed to
restrict the use of land be written in some form of enforceable writing before the
property is rezoned unless the property is appropriate for all uses in the new
classification without the limitations of any proposed restrictions.
Louis W.

274. See supra notes 43-46 & 191-95 and accompanying text.
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